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Abstract
The thesis is an exploration of the relations between know-how, abilities, and ordinary knowl-
edge of facts. It is shown that there is a distinctively practical sort of know-how and a corre-
sponding interpretation of 'S knows how to 0', and that this special sort of know-how, while
possessing representational content, is not simply ordinary knowledge-that. The view rests
on a novel distinction between two interpretations of the Intellectualist slogan, familiar from
the work of Gilbert Ryle, that know-how is a kind of knowledge-that. The distinction allows
us to clarify the issues that are at stake in the debate and see the possibility of a position that
combines aspects of both Intellectualism and anti-Intellectualism. An entailment from know-
how to a certain sort of ability is defended, and it is shown that the present view preserves
the possibility of appealing to know-how to block Frank Jackson's "knowledge argument"
against physicalism.
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1 Introduction
I think it is intuitively obvious that know-how is a special kind of knowledge, in contrast
to ordinary knowledge of where George Bush lives or knowledge that Portland is rainy. I
think it is intuitively obvious, for example, that my knowing how to swim does not consist
in my having ordinary knowledge of facts about swimming. Many other philosophers and
laypeople I have spoken with also find these things obvious. But in the tradition of a good
portion of philosophy, I will be devoting my efforts here to defending what already seems
obvious.
There are several reasons for my defense of the obvious. The first is that even if a claim
seems obvious, thinking about it carefully can often reveal that the issues are less clear than
one initially thought. Indeed, sometimes it turns out to be unclear what the "obvious" claim is
supposed to be. This has turned out to be true of claims about know-how. My goal in writing
this thesis was to get clearer about know-how and related issues, and I hope my work will
show others, whether or not they share my initial intuitions, that those issues are complex and
interesting.
A second reason for my defense is that not even the obvious can win the approval of all
philosophers. The hold-outs force us to face arguments against what we thought was obvious,
and we must evaluate whether the argument or our original intuition stands up better under
careful consideration. I think that strong intuitions deserve defense, but that philosophical
arguments can in principle outweigh such intuitions if they are suitably compelling and if no
equally compelling counter-arguments can be provided. To get at the truth about know-how,
then, we need to go beyond prima facie intuitions and explore the arguments.
A third reason for exploring the status of intuitive claims about know-how is that doing so
sheds light on a variety of other issues such as ordinary propositional knowledge, intelligence,
actions and abilities, and semantics for embedded questions and modal expressions. And
furthermore, the nature of know-how and these other phenomena are relevant to big issues
elsewhere in philosophy. They bear, for instance, on how we might block Frank Jackson's
famous "knowledge argument" against physicalism. Gaining a better understanding of know-
how helps us address far-reaching philosophical issues.
My discussion will proceed as follows. In section 2, I try to find a clear and precise state-
ment of Intellectualism, the view that, roughly, some know-how is not special, but rather con-
sists in ordinary knowledge of facts. I note that there are multiple kinds of know-how, and dub
the kind that is of concern to the anti-Intellectualist practical knowledge or practical know-
how. In section 3, I lay further foundations for evaluating Intellectualism by explaining one
standard view of the semantics of knowledge-wh attributions, e.g. 'John knows where...',
'John knows why...', or 'John knows who...'. This is necessary to allow us to understand
the central strategy of Intellectualism, the strategy of treating attributions of know-how on
analogy with other cases in which 'knows' is complemented by an embedded question. The
basic idea is simple: Where Q is an embedded question, 'S knows Q' is true iff S knows a
relevant answer (or every such answer) to Q.
The argument for treating know-how attributions like other attributions of knowledge-wh
is set out in sections 3.2 and 3.3, and the remainder of section 3 is devoted to exploring various
options for responding to that argument. The argument is essentially a more linguistically
detailed version of this: Since there are no reasons from within contemporary syntactic theory
or semantic theories of embedded questions for distinguishing 'S knows how to 0' from other
knowledge-wh attributions that attribute ordinary knowledge of facts, know-how is also just
------------
a kind of ordinary knowledge of facts. A large portion of my evaluation of this argument is
concerned with a source of data with the potential to undermine its central claim: linguistic
constructions other than 'knows how', 'knows when', etc. Most centrally, in section 3.6, I
discuss constructions in languages other than English that indicate that practical knowledge
really is a special kind of knowledge. In these languages, practical know-how, rather than any
other kind of knowledge-wh, is attributed with linguistically distinctive means.
Section 4 contains an elaboration and further evaluation of Intellectualism. In 4.1, I at-
tempt to be more explicit on what proposition is supposed to be known when someone knows
how to do something. The central question is how to interpret the infinitival construction in
the wh-complement. Intuitively, and as is commonly noted in the linguistic literature, con-
structions like 'where to 0' or 'for x to 0' are interpreted as containing some sort of modality.
I note that intuitive judgments about possession of know-how can most straightforwardly be
accommodated by treating the modality as the modality expressed in claims like 'S can 0'.
In section 4.2, I consider an alternative way to accommodate the judgments by appealing to
Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson's "practical modes of presentation" (PMPs). I offer
some reasons to be skeptical of the explanatory utility of PMPs and skeptical that appealing
to PMPs preserves the spirit of the Intellectualist position.
In section 4.3 I show that practical know-how lacks various properties possessed by
paradigm cases of knowledge-that - it is independent of justificatory considerations, for
instance, and is not generally available to higher cognitive processes like conscious reason-
ing and verbal expression. An analysis of practical know-how in terms of knowledge-that
appears to impose requirements that are too strong. But, I argue in section 5.1, we cannot
straightforwardly conclude that Intellectualism is false. We must distinguish two versions of
Intellectualism, Weak (WI) and Strong (SI). The difference is in which properties we take to
be essential to the notion of knowledge-that used in the analysis of know-how. The consider-
ations in section 4.3 show that practical know-how is not knowledge-that of a sort that fits the
traditional conception, so that (SI) is false, but this is compatible with all know-how being a
kind of knowledge with propositional content.
In the remainder of section 5, I endorse (WI) on grounds that it is the most straightforward
way to accommodate both the data in favor of know-how being special and the appealing sim-
plicity of treating know-how attributions on analogy with other attributions of knowledge-wh.
It captures senses in which both the Intellectualist and the anti-Intellectualist have insights to
offer. I argue for a form of (WI) on which practical knowledge is linguistically manifested
in an ambiguity in 'knows', and on which know-how entails a certain kind of ability. In
supporting the latter aspect of the view, I connect the context-sensitivity of modal expres-
sions with the context-sensitivity of ability attributions and account for a variety of putative
counterexamples to my view.
In the final section of the dissertation, I illustrate how our conclusions about know-how
bear on the ability response to Jackson's knowledge argument. The critical elements of the
argument and response are clarified by our distinction between (WI) and (SI), and we see that
the falsity of (SI) is sufficient to block Jackson's anti-physicalist conclusion - (WI) need not
be false for the ability response to be effective.
2 Characterizing Intellectualism
Gilbert Ryle (1946) and (1949) introduced the term 'Intellectualism' to refer to a view
that, in his opinion, overemphasized the role of ordinary knowledge of facts in an account of
intelligent behavior. It not immediately clear, however, what the defining thesis of Intellectu-
alism is supposed to be. The project of this chapter is to distinguish a number of Intellectualist
theses and consider the relationships among them.
2.1 'Know-how'
In contemporary literature, Intellectualism is usually taken to be the following claim:
(1) Know-how is a kind of knowledge-that.
'Know-how' is a familiar term of ordinary language. We commonly say things like 'Fixing
a bicycle takes a lot of know-how'. But there are two issues worth raising about the use
of 'know-how' in (1). First is the question of whether Intellectualism is supposed to be a
thesis as narrowly focussed as (1). Is the view only about know-how, or is it also (or solely)
supposed to concern abilities, skills, or intelligent behavior? These notions, along with a
number of others, are employed throughout the literature. Ryle, for instance, focusses mainly
on the notions of intelligence and intelligent behavior. Although the relevant chapter of The
Concept of Mind is titled 'Knowing How and Knowing That', his initial statement of his thesis
suggests that know-how was less important to his discussion than contemporary discussions
would lead one to believe.
The main object of this chapter is to show that there are many activities which di-
rectly display qualities of mind, yet are neither themselves intellectual operations
nor yet effects of intellectual operations. Intelligent practice is not a step-child
of theory. On the contrary theorising is one practice amongst others and is itself
intelligently or stupidly conducted. [...] It is important to correct from the start
the intellectualist doctrine which tries to define intelligence in terms of the appre-
hension of truths, instead of the apprehension of truths in terms of intelligence.
(1949: 26)
Besides 'know-how', 'ability', 'skill', and 'practice', Ryle appeals to a variety of other
terms to help him characterize and criticize Intellectualism. A quick survey yields 'com-
petence', 'capacity', 'habit', 'bent', 'disposition', 'performance', 'procedure', 'operation',
'task', and 'exercise'. There is correspondingly a variety of theses that we can extract from
Ryle's discussion to characterize Intellectualism. Two of the more prominent ones are these:
(2) To be intelligent is to apprehend certain truths.
(3) "Whenever an agent [0s] intelligently, his [4ing] is preceded and steered by another
internal act of considering a regulative proposition appropriate to [4ing]" (1949: 31).
Ryle is not always clear about the relationships among these and other theses. For an illus-
tration of this point, it is worthwhile to look at one of the first occurrences of a know-how
locution in Ryle's book. He writes:
When a person is described by one or other of the intelligence-epithets such as
'shrewd' or 'silly', 'prudent' or 'imprudent', the description imputes to him not
the knowledge, or ignorance, of this or that truth, but the ability, or inability,
to do certain sorts of things. Theorists have been so preoccupied with the task
of investigating the nature, the source, and the credentials of the theories that
we adopt that they have for the most part ignored the question what it is for
someone to know how to perform tasks. In ordinary life, on the contrary, as
well as in the special business of teaching, we are much more concerned with
people's competences than with their cognitive repertoires, with the operations
than with the truths that they learn. Indeed, even when we are concerned with
their intellectual excellences and deficiencies, we are interested less in the stocks
of truths that they acquire and retain than in their capacities to find out truths
for themselves and their ability to organize and exploit them, when discovered.
Often we deplore a person's ignorance of some fact only because we deplore the
stupidity of which his ignorance is a consequence. (1949: 27).
Note that 'know how' occurs immediately after the mention of abilities, though there
has been no argument provided for the identification of know-how with ability, and there is
no suggestion that the topic is being changed. Indeed, the first sentence states a distinction
between knowledge of truths and abilities, and the second sentence is supposed to note that
theorists have ignored everything on one side of that distinction. Ryle thus holds (4):
(4) Know-how is an ability.
Mixed in the same paragraph are references to the performance of tasks, competences, capac-
ities, and operations. It seems that for Ryle it is completely natural to assume that the correct
account of these aspects of our lives goes along with the correct account of know-how. I
think this assumption is not simply a reflection of Ryle's peculiar philosophical disposition
- when explaining Intellectualism to non-philosophical acquaintances, they frequently ex-
press skepticism that know-how is just ordinary knowledge of facts on the grounds that having
know-how is just having an ability or skill. Perhaps that bit of folk-philosophy is mistaken
(see section 5 below for an argument that it is not), but regardless, the temptation to equate
know-how with abilities, skills, competences, etc. suggests to me that an argument that re-
solved (1) while leaving the status of these other notions unaddressed would fail to engage
with an important strand in anti-Intellectualist thinking. My discussion in following sections
will explore the connection between know-how some of these other notions.
A second question about the use of 'know-how' in (1) is whether the thesis is intended to
be about all know-how or only some know-how. Is the Intellectualist's claim that all know-
how is knowledge-that or the claim that some know-how is knowledge-that? Jason Stanley
and Timothy Williamson (hereafter, S&W) clearly hope to establish the former (2001: 444).
Jaako Hintikka, by contrast, claims that there are two uses of know-how attributions, one of
which, "the skill sense", cannot be analyzed as knowledge-that (1975: 14). So while S&W
and Hintikka are all standardly considered Intellectualists, the former hold (5) while the latter
only holds (6).
(5) All know-how is a kind of knowledge-that.
(6) Some know-how is a kind of knowledge-that.
On the anti-Intellectualist side, the authors who explicitly say something about the distinction
between (5) and (6) agree that the former is the thesis of primary interest. For instance, see
Sgaravatti and Zardini (2008) and Lihoreau (2008). I suspect that other anti-Intellectualists
would similarly be satisfied with establishing that some know-how is not a kind of knowledge-
that, at least so long as the kind of know-how in question was the kind at issue in standard
examples used to motivate anti-Intellectualism. Some cases of know-how are clearly not the
sort of interest, as when 'S knows how to 0' has a deontic interpretation on which it conveys
something like 'S knows which way he ought to 0'. Such a reading seems to me available
in a context in which what is under discussion is explicitly what one ought to do: "Are you
sure you understand which way you're supposed to swim in the race tomorrow? It's the most
important race of the year." "Don't worry, I know how to swim: do the crawl with the special
new kick technique you instructed me on." In the same spirit, D.G. Brown offers "The janitor
knows how to arrange the tables" (1970: 228), and S&W offer "Hannah knows how to ride a
bicycle in New York City (namely carefully)" (2001: 425, fn. 23).
As S&W admit (2001: 425), the deontic interpretation is not the reading of know-how
attributions of interest to the anti-Intellectualist. There is a more obvious and more interest-
ing interpretation, the one we can point to by noting that even if one should wear a helmet
when riding a bicycle, a person who does not know that fact can still know how to ride a
bicycle. Further examples are probably not necessary to provide the flavor of a non-deontic
reading, but just for good measure, take an ordinary context in which Damien is invited to go
swimming. If he sincerely responds "Sorry, I don't know how to swim", he cannot be proven
a liar by interrogation as to whether he knows that one is supposed to swim in such-and-such
way. Of course, highlighting a non-deontic interpretation of know-how attributions is not yet
to explain how this reading should be understood - that issue will be discussed throughout
the remainder of this dissertation. But it will be useful to have a term for the kind of non-
deontic know-how that anti-Intellectualists intend to highlight. We can refer to it as practical
knowledge or practical know-how.
I would like to draw attention to a point here about what it would be for there to be
multiple kinds of know-how. I have been discussing the existence of multiple readings or in-
terpretations of 'S knows how to 0', but this way of talking suggests that there is an ambiguity
in the meaning of such sentences. This is not the only way to understand the idea that there
are multiple kinds of know-how. For a helpful comparison: it was an empirical discovery that
there are two sorts of memory, working memory and long-term memory. But there are not
two readings of 'S remembers that p' - the sentence is not ambiguous as to whether working
memory or long-term memory is at issue. The semantics of 'remember' carves mental states
up more coarsely than that. More generally, there is no bar to our language carving out a cat-
egory that, on philosophical or empirical inspection (or even commonsense reflection), turns
out to admit of more fine-grained distinctions. In fact, this is a totally normal characteristic
of everyday terms. 'Furniture', for instance, applies to items that can be naturally grouped
into sub-categories (tables, sofas, etc.). There are many kinds of furniture, though 'furniture'
does not in any standard sense have multiple interpretations.
If we were being particularly wary of use/mention errors, we would actually never use
the claim that there are multiple kinds of know-how to say that know-how attributions (at-
tributions using 'knows' with a complement 'how...') are ambiguous. If a term or locution
is ambiguous, like 'bank' or 'fan', any occurrence of it has a particular interpretation. 'John
has many fans' may mean that there are many people who (roughly) are admirers of John,
or that there are many air-circulation devices that John owns, but we cannot use the sentence
to mean that there are many things satisfying the disjunction of being an admirer of John or
being an air-circulation device owned by John. An analogous point holds for 'There are two
kinds of fans' - if we are being careful, we should use this either to mean that there are two
kinds of admirers or to mean that there are two kinds of air-circulation devices. We should
not use it to express the fact that 'fan' can pick out either of the two sorts of thing. It seems,
however, that ordinary language is more forgiving than philosophers are, so that we can felic-
itously claim 'There are two kinds of fans: admirers and air-circulation devices'. Speaking in
this looser way also offers the convenience of not having to explicitly refer to lexical items,
so I propose to follow the vulgar: I intend to use talk of kinds of know-how in the loose,
more encompassing ordinary-language way. The way I will write, 'there are multiple kinds
of know-how' may be made true by the existence of multiple interpretations of know-how
locutions, but it does not require the latter. It may also be made true by know-how being like
furniture or memory - ambiguity is not required to say that couches are a kind of furniture
and working memory is a kind of memory.
Another cautionary point is that the claim that there are multiple kinds of know-how
should not be taken as equivalent to the claim that know-how (or the 'knows' in 'knows
how") is disjunctive. Terms like 'furniture' and 'remember' are similarly not disjunctive, at
least not as I think the latter term is ordinarily used. Philosophers call 'jade' disjunctive be-
cause its extension forms a less natural category than either of the two categories of stone that
comprise it, jadeite and nephrite. Jadeite and nephrite are natural-kind terms, well-behaved
terms that have as their extensions some naturally delineated chunks of reality, but jade is
not a natural-kind term. Perhaps it was intended to be, but later investigation revealed that
while all bits of jade share some superficial characteristics, nature's joints are to be found at
a lower level. 'Furniture' and 'remember' are not like this. For one thing, they are not terms
intended to pick out a category naturally delineated in terms of underlying physical or chemi-
cal structure, so they are not terms that have failed to secure the sort of extension intended for
them. Furthermore, the categories of chairs and tables are natural in some sense appropriate
to artifacts, but so is the category of furniture, so there is no problem of naturalness. Simi-
larly, cognitive science has found some natural categories of remembering corresponding to
working memory and long-term memory, but these are both kinds of remembering, and the
latter, broader category is natural in a certain sense appropriate to folk-psychological notions
(in contrast to, e.g., remembering-or-doubting).
I claimed earlier that there are deontic and non-deontic interpretations of 'S knows how
to 0'. We can now make a more general and cautious claim on the same basis: there are
multiple kinds of know-how. And I want to interpret (5) and (6) so as to take account of the
1I do not know that there is a clear philosophical consensus on whether 'disjunctive' applies to terms, prop-
erties, sets, or all of the above. I will mix uses with the assumption that nothing important hangs on it.
fact that there are multiple kinds of know-how, perhaps but not necessarily multiple interpre-
tations of know-how locutions. If practical know-how is not a kind of knowledge-that while
deontic know-how is, then (6) is true but (5) false. If each kind of know-how is not a kind
of knowledge-that, then both theses are false. I will spend some time in sections 3 and 4
addressing these theses, but will only turn to more specific claims about interpretations of 'S
knows how to 0' in section 5.2
2.2 'Knowledge-that'
'Knowledge-that' is a philosopher's term. Laypeople do not say 'Einstein had a lot of
knowledge-that', or 'Written language allows knowledge-that to be passed down through
generations.' This is even clearer with the term 'propositional knowledge', which is often
used in place of 'knowledge-that' to state the thesis of Intellectualism. Nevertheless, laypeo-
ple obviously talk about knowledge regularly when they use sentences of the form 'S knows
that p'. The term 'knowledge-that' is simply a device to talk about that sort of knowledge
while opposing it with acquaintance-knowledge (John knows Bill) and without assuming that
know-how is included in the category. So, given that 'knowledge-that' refers to the sort of
knowledge familiar from everyday talk, it may seem that we do not need to worry about
explicating the use of the phrase in statements of Intellectualism.
For much of my discussion, I will simply appeal to that intuitive understanding of 'knowledge-
that'. But eventually (section 5), we will see the need for clarification. As a warm-up for that
discussion, I at least want to provide a preliminary indication of some non-equivalent ways
in which 'knowledge-that' might be explained.
(7) Knowledge-that is knowledge with a proposition as a relatum.
(8) Knowledge-that is knowledge attributable with a sentence of the form 'S knows that
p'.
These definitions are both prima facie reasonable, but they are not equivalent and neither
is fully satisfactory. If some propositions are ineffable but knowable, then some knowledge
satisfies (7) but not (8). If philosophical orthodoxy is mistaken in thinking that 'S knows
that p' attributes to S a relation to a proposition, 2 then (8) might be satisfied even if (7) is
not. Of course, all participants in the debate over Intellectualism have assumed that 'S knows
that p' attributes a kind of knowledge with a proposition as a relatum, so it may seem that
(7) is unproblematic. But I want to be as clear as possible on what exactly is at stake in the
debate over Intellectualism. If it turned out that 'S knows that p' did not express a relation
to a proposition, philosophers would not for that reason abandon the question of whether
Intellectualism were true. They might still want to know whether know-how were a sub-type
of the type of knowledge we attribute with 'S knows that p', whatever the correct analysis of
the latter.
But (8) is not totally adequate either. In particular, it would be good to abstract away from
the question of ineffability. One way to do so is to say that on the most natural way of cate-
gorizing kinds of knowledge, effability is not a category-defining characteristic. Knowledge
may be ineffable but still be knowledge of the same kind as the knowledge that is attributable
with 'S knows that p'. For instance, 'S knows that p' might be given Russell's analysis as
a relation between individuals and objects and properties, and knowledge that was ineffable
might be an instance of the same relation.
So how do we explicate 'knowledge-that'? Do we need to? I will not answer these
questions now, but when we return to them in section 5 and, briefly, section 3.8, it will be
useful to have kept them in mind.
2.3 '...is a kind of...'
The Intellectualist theses we have considered appeal to the locution 'is a kind of'. How
should one go about establishing or refuting such theses? Philosophers are used to evaluat-
2As has been argued by, e.g., Friederike Moltmann (2003), following Russell (1918).
ing theses that state necessary or sufficient conditions, and several have suggested to me in
conversation that Intellectualism can be stated in those terms, so it is worthwhile investigat-
ing whether a thesis like (5) can be restated as a conditional or biconditional. On their face,
claims of the form 'Fs are a kind of G' state a necessary condition on Fs. Thus, (9-a) seems
to be captured fairly well by (9-b).
(9) a. Dogs are a kind of mammal.
b. Vx(x is a dog - x is a mammal).
But of course, the form of (9-b) is not really helpful for stating the thesis of Intellectualism.
A strict parallel would force us to write as if there were things that were know-how and
knowledge-that, an unfamiliar way of speaking that would make it no easier to evaluate the
thesis.
(10) Vx(x is know-how --+ x is knowledge-that).
We can state a thesis that sounds a bit more natural by quantifying over states of knowledge,
but the resulting thesis, like (10), seems to me to offer no hygienic advance over (5).
(11) Vx(x is a state of know-how -+ x is a state of knowledge-that).
A natural alternative idea is to quantify over knowers, stating a condition on anyone who
knows how to do something. The easiest way to attempt this is to focus on one paradigm sort
of know-how, knowledge how to swim, say, taking Intellectualism per se to be a generaliza-
tion of the schema. A first try at a formulation is the following:
(12) 3p O Vx (x knows how to swim --+ x knows p).
This is inadequate, since even if (12) were sufficient for Intellectualism (about knowing how
to swim), Intellectualists should avoid such a strong claim. For suppose that in other worlds,
the facts relevant to swimming are different. In world w, say, all the liquids in which one
can swim have a different viscosity, requiring substantively different swimming techniques
than are required in the actual world. If one tries to move one's limbs at familiar speeds,
the resistance will be so great that one will quickly be exhausted. To avoid drowning, one's
movements must be carried out much more slowly than in the actual world. On one Intellec-
tualist view, all competent swimmers in w know propositions about the technique to be used
to swim in conditions like those in w. And actual swimmers know different propositions,
propositions about the technique to be used in the actual world. Since it ought to be compati-
ble with Intellectualism that agents who know how to swim at different worlds know different
propositions about swimming technique, it seems that the wide-scope existential quantifier in
(12) must be moved inward.
(13) O 3p Vx (x knows how to swim --+ x knows p).
But the resulting thesis is still too strong to be taken as a defining thesis of Intellectualism,
facing a problem that afflicts (12) as well. An Intellectualist might maintain that an agent
x's knowledge how to swim should be understood in terms of x's knowledge of a certain sort
of proposition about x - perhaps, as on S&W's view, discussed below, the proposition that
such-and-such is a way for x to swim. On this view, even in a single world w there is no
proposition about swimming technique known by all those who know (in w) how to swim.
So (13) must be weakened even more. We might try (14):
(14) O Vx 3p (x knows how to swim -+ x knows p).
But this weakens the thesis too much, for setting aside questions about the existence of propo-
sitions, this formula is equivalent to (15):
(15) O Vx (x knows how to swim -- 3p x knows p).
And, plausibly, everyone knows some fact or other. An anti-Intellectualist can agree
with that. And not even that much is necessary to verify (15) - we do not need to agree
that everyone knows some fact or other, just that everyone intelligent enough to know how
to swim does. And the latter does not amount to the claim that knowledge how to swim is
knowledge of some fact, so we have not yet found a proper characterization of Intellectualism
in terms of necessary conditions for know-how.
There is a natural move to try at this point. We can build into our thesis some restrictions
on the relevant proposition. Suppose we simply add to (15) a specification of what proposition
is known by agents who know how to swim. Let us suppose that the proposition is what would
be expressed by an explanation of how to swim (we could think of this as a set of instructions
for swimming or an answer to the question of how to swim), and we can put the revised thesis
as follows.
(16) O iVx (x knows how to swim -- 3p (p explains how to swim & x knows p)).
Is this thesis an adequate statement of Intellectualism? No, and the reason why not brings out
an important point. Consider the following view, with which (16) is logically compatible:
(17) O Vx (x knows how to swim - 3p (p explains how to swim & x knows p & x is able
to swim in the way explained by p)).3
On a view like (17), know-how requires propositional knowledge, but it also requires an
ability. So is it a form of Intellectualism or of anti-Intellectualism? One might say that
according to (17), know-how is a kind of propositional knowledge: propositional knowledge
that is accompanied by a related ability. Or: According to (17), know-how is a kind of
ability: an ability to implement a certain set of instructions one knows. Which of these ways
of understanding (17) is right, or are both right? Neither, I think - (17) simply does not say
whether or not knowledge how to swim is an ability or a bit of propositional knowledge.
3Cf. Koethe (2002).
It may be useful to compare the following (crude) theses about other mental states:
(18) a. O Vp Vx (x wishes p -+ (x believes not-p & x would prefer p to not-p)).
b. LI Vp Vx (x knows p --, (x believes p & x has warrant for believing p & p is
true)).
Suppose someone claimed that wishing were a kind of belief, and someone else claimed
that it were a kind of preference (or pro-attitude more generally). If pressed to takes sides,
which one should we take? I would say that it is more plausible that wishing is a kind of
preference, though it also seems plausible that wishing requires a belief that the wished-for
proposition does not obtain. Compare a dispute between someone who claims that knowledge
of a proposition is a kind of belief and someone who claims that knowledge of a proposition
is a kind of warrant-possession. If pressed to take sides, I would say that the former certainly
seems more plausible, though knowledge of a proposition also seems to require warrant.
So what is the relationship between claims identifying a mental state with a kind of belief
and claims like (18-a) and (18-b)? For both wishing and knowing, a certain belief is claimed
to be a necessary condition. But the two theses could be paired with distinct claims about
whether the relevant state is a kind of belief. This brings out the point about (17): It does
not take a stand on the intuitive question of Intellectualism, whether know-how is a kind of
knowledge-that. Generalizing the point, theses that state necessary conditions for knowing
how to do something do not provide us the tools we need to capture Intellectualism more
precisely than with its intuitive formulation.
Summing up so far: it initially seemed plausible that Intellectualism could be stated more
precisely as a necessary condition on knowing how to do something. To say that dogs are
a kind of mammal just seems to amount to this: Being a mammal is a necessary condition
for being a dog. But exploring theses of this sort has not turned out to yield a helpful and
adequate version of Intellectualism. It might be thought that the problem could be rectified
by appealing to a statement of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing how to do
something. But this strategy does not yet resolve the central problem. For the points about
(18-a) and (18-b) apply equally to (19-a) and (19-b):
(19) a. O Vp Vx (x wishes p +- (x believes not-p & x would prefer p to not-p)).
b. O Vp Vx (x knows p +-, (x believes p & x has warrant for believing p & p is
true)).
Thesis (19-a) does not tell us whether wishing is a kind of belief or a kind of preference,
and (19-b) does not tell us whether knowledge of a proposition is a kind of belief or a kind
of warrant-possession. As far as I can see, necessary and sufficient conditions only provide
a case for a such a claim when only one phenomenon appears on the right-hand side of the
biconditional. Witness (20):
(20) O Vp Vx (x is certain of proposition p +- x believes p to degree 1).
Whether or not (20) is a good account of certainty, its truth would make a compelling case for
the claim that certainty is a kind of belief. But it is not so easy to get an adequate statement
of Intellectualism. An obviously inadequate (because obviously false) thesis is this:
(21) OI Vx (x knows how to swim +- 3p x knows p).
There are people who know some facts without knowing how to swim. Now that we are
working with a biconditional, a more natural attempt would be to shift the existential quanti-
fier back to an intermediate position.
(22) O Vx 3p (x knows how to swim +- x knows p).4
But this still faces a problem like one discussed above. An anti-Intellectualist might assume,
as is plausible, that (necessarily) everyone intelligent enough to know how to swim knows
4This is not equivalent, since 3p(Kxp --+ Fx) does not entail (3pKxp) -+ Fx.
some fact or other and further, that (necessarily) no one who does not know how to swim is
omniscient. That is, everyone who does not know how to swim is such that there is some fact
that they do not know. These two assumptions do not entail Intellectualism, but they entail that
for any individual x, we can pick a proposition p such that 'x knows how to swim' matches in
truth-value with 'x knows p' - if x knows how to swim, just pick a random proposition that
x knows, and if x does not know how to swim, just pick a random proposition that x does not
know. So (22) is logically compatible with anti-Intellectualism.
Recall that we cannot strengthen the thesis by swapping the universal and existential
quantifiers, since Intellectualists such as S&W deny that everyone who knows how to swim
thereby knows the same proposition. What we can do is to combine the biconditional strategy
with the strategy attempted just before - we restrict the relevant proposition. This can be
done in two ways. First, using the wider-scope existential as in (22):
(23) Ol Vx 3p (p explains how to swim & (x knows how to swim +-+ x knows p)).
This avoids the problem for (22), although questions remain about what sorts of proposi-
tions the Intellectualist should be restricting herself to in (23). Suppose that the relevant
propositions include the proposition that simply instructs one to swim by doing the back-
stroke, or even more uninformatively, to swim by moving one's body appropriately. An
anti-Intellectualist could hold, I think, that everyone who knows how to swim knows that
moving one's body appropriately is how to do it, though there should be little doubt that the
latter is not what the know-how consists in. So the left-to-right direction of (23) is plausi-
bly compatible with anti-Intellectualism. Now suppose that the relevant class of propositions
also includes propositions that no one knows. Perhaps a complete description in fundamen-
tal physical terms of a way of swimming would provide such an unknown proposition. So
for any x who does not know how to swim, the anti-Intellectualist could hold that there is
a proposition explaining how to swim that x does not know. It follows that the right-to-left
direction of (23) is compatible with anti-Intellectualism, and hence that the whole thesis does
not suffice to characterize Intellectualism.
Of course, the argument just given made liberal assumptions about what counts as a
proposition that explains how to swim. Or, more generally, it made liberal assumptions about
what kinds of propositions the Intellectualist would restrict herself to in a thesis like (23).
Perhaps there is some way of filling in the thesis that is informative, sufficiently strong to
count as a form of Intellectualism, and defensible (see the discussion of S&W's view below).
But we might just as well shift back to the narrowest reading of the existential quantifier now
that we are using a biconditional and a restriction on the relevant propositions.
(24) O Vx (x knows how to swim +-+ 3p (p explains how to swim & x knows p)).
Is this thesis obviously false in the way that (21) is? That is, is it obvious that there are
people who know propositions that explain how to swim without knowing how to swim, or
people who know how to swim without knowing any propositions that explain how to swim?
This raises part of the problem raised for (23). There are people who do not know how
to swim, but know that one way to swim is by doing the backstroke. But this refutes (24)
only if the propositions that explain how to swim include the proposition that one way to
swim is by doing the backstroke. The big question, then, is what the propositions are that
the Intellectualist wants to appeal to. A hygienic version of her view could be represented
schematically as follows:
(25) V4 O Vx (x knows how to 4 + 3p (Fp & x knows p)).
It is difficult to say what sort of F would make (25) into a clearly Intellectualist position.
One thing that would not do would be to take Intellectualism itself to be the thesis that there is
some F that makes (25) true. For suppose that F is the property of being the proposition that
1+1=2 in a world where x knows how to swim, or the property of being the proposition that
1+1=2 in a world where x is able to swim. 5 F must apply only to appropriate propositions,
5Thanks here to Steve Yablo.
but I think we cannot go much further than to say that an appropriate proposition is one of
the sort suggested above, one that explains how to swim or answers the question of how
to swim. Perhaps a recognizably Intellectualist position could appeal to some other sort of
proposition, but I do not at present have a way to clearly specify the possible range of such
propositions. At any rate, to defend her view, the Intellectualist ought to provide a property
F in a sufficiently explicit way so as to demonstrate that her version of (25) does not fall to
one of the objections presented above. In the following section, I will explore one attempt to
do that.
I want to emphasize that the difficulty in finding a totally precise, defining thesis of Intel-
lectualism does not mean that there is nothing to the original, intuitive statement of the view.
It only means there are some limits to how simple we can make our project of determining
what does or does not count as evidence against Intellectualism. It is valuable, I think, to
have seen the difficulty in hygienically defining Intellectualism, for two reasons: First, we
have seen a preview of the sort of counterexamples that might be posed to Intellectualism,
preparing us for more in-depth discussion below. Second, we have been given reason for
a healthy caution about which theses really amount to forms of Intellectualism, a caution
that will be reinforced in section 5 below when we discover that there are more important
distinctions to be made among candidate Intellectualist theses.
3 Knowledge-wh attributions
As we will see later, the most prominent account of the semantics of 'S knows how to 0' is
parasitic on an account of other constructions in which 'knows' is followed by an embedded
question, a complement that begins with a question-word, e.g. 'how Bill swims', 'when to
take his medicine', 'why John went to Montana', 'where the car accident happened'. Thus
it will be worthwhile to spend some time exploring these less controversial attributions of
knowledge.
- ------------m
3.1 Semantics for knowledge-wh attributions
(26) Bill knows when Gladys exercises.
Suppose that Gladys exercises at 7am. Then the following view is plausible: (26) is true iff
Bill knows that Gladys exercises at 7am. The orthodox view in linguistics is that this, in one
or another spelled-out form, is the correct account of knowledge-wh in general. The rough
idea dates back 50 years to work by philosopher C.L. Hamblin (1958), though advances in
syntax and semantics have led to sophisticated linguistic analyses.
I will sketch one variation on the analysis of knowledge-wh in terms of knowledge-that,
following the account presented by S&W. One aspect of the view consists of syntactic claims.
The complement of 'knows' in (26) is a clause of the following general form: [wheni [Gladys
[exercises ti]]], where ti is a trace left by the movement of 'when' from its original position
in the structure [Gladys [exercises when]]]. The latter structure clearly resembles structures
of the form [Gladys [exercises at 7am]] or [Gladys [exercises at 8am]], where the relevant
specification of time has been replaced by the temporal question-word 'when'.
If we think of a question as a request to be supplied with a proposition as answer, it is
natural to think of the structure of a question as revealing what sort of proposition is being
requested. The question-word helps the speaker formulate a sort of fill-in-the-blank sentence
for the audience. In [Gladys [exercises when]]], 'when' indicates: (a) The location of the
blank that a questioner would like the audience to fill in, and (b) that the audience should
replace the blank with a specification of a time. We thus have a straightforward prediction
of what should count as an answer to 'When does Gladys exercise?'. It should be something
of the form 'Gladys exercises at t'. Now, if we ask what communicative purpose could be
served by a sentence in which a question is embedded under a knowledge-verb, there is only
one obvious proposal: Such a sentence indicates that an individual possesses the information
that the question would be used to request - the individual knows the answer to the question.
This suggestive line of thought shows how a very basic look at the syntax of wh-complements,
together with some crude pragmatic ideas, suffices to motivate a view of knowledge-wh in
the spirit of Hamblin.
A slightly more formal explanation of the meanings of knowledge-wh attributions is ob-
tained by taking the wh-complement to denote the set of propositions that would count as
answers to the embedded question. So [when/ [Gladys [exercises ti]]] might denote {that
Gladys exercises at 7am, that Gladys exercises at 8am, ... }. 'Knows' then takes an individ-
ual and this set as its arguments and delivers truth iff the individual knows a true member of
the set. Or, in some contexts, all true members of the set - see Groenendijk and Stokhof
(1997) for discussion of "mention-some" versus "mention-all" readings of knowledge-wh
attributions.
It is worth noting that one does not know when Gladys exercises simply by knowing
the proposition that Gladys exercises when she exercises. Similarly, in almost every con-
text it would be wrong to say that one knew when Gladys exercised if one only knew that
Gladys exercised when she was awake. This illustrates that there are either restrictions on
what propositions go into the set denoted by the wh-complement or restrictions built into
the knowledge-verb. S&W's discussion suggests the latter course: John knows that Gladys
exercises when she is awake, but he does not know when Gladys exercises unless he knows
a contextually relevant proposition of the form 'Gladys exercises at t'. This complication in
the account will make some trouble for us later, but I will set it aside for the moment.
Consider now knowledge-wh attributions with complements headed by 'how' instead of
by 'when'.
(27) Bill knows how Gladys exercises.
It is straightforward to extend the view explained so far to handle this sentence. The question
'How does Gladys exercise?' conveys a request to be supplied with a proposition such as that
Gladys exercises by jogging, that Gladys exercises by lifting weights, or perhaps that Gladys
exercises diligently. The set denoted by [howi [Gladys exercises ti]] then denotes a set of
propositions of the form 'Gladys exercises in way w', where 'in way w' is to be replaced by
an adverb or adverbial phrase that describes Gladys' exercising, and (27) is true iff Bill knows
a (contextually relevant) proposition in that set.
Slightly more complex are examples in which the wh-complement is an infinitival clause,
as in (28):
(28) Bill knows when to exercise.
As S&W explain, the infinitival clauses of the sort above have two distinctive features. First,
they contain no overt subject. Second, they contain no tense. S&W offer tools to accommo-
date both features. First, they cite the common view in linguistics that there is a silent subject,
PRO, present in (28). PRO, like a pronoun, picks up its semantic value from the subject of
the matrix clause, in this case 'Bill'. This explains the intuitive sense that in sentences like
'Bill wants to go to the party', it is Bill himself that must go to the party for Bill's desire to
be satisfied - the sentence is better represented as [Billi [wants [PROi to go to the party]]].
In other constructions, PRO sometimes seems to have an 'arbitrary' reading like the pro-
noun 'one', but I will follow S&W in assuming that sentences like (28) involve the anaphoric
interpretation of PRO.
Second, S&W explain that infinitival constructions should be understood in terms of some
sort of modality.
So, infinitives appear to have at least two different kinds of readings. On the first
reading, they express deontic modality. In this case, a use of 'to F' expresses
something like 'ought to F'. On the second reading, they express some kind of
possibility. On this reading, a use of 'to F' expresses something like 'can F'.
(2001: 424)
According to S&W, then, we should expect [PRO to exercise] to express something like
'he should exercise' or 'he can exercise'. Putting this together with the general strategy
above for embedded questions, we should expect [when/ [PRO to exercise ti]] to denote a set
of propositions of one of the following sorts: (a) {that he should exercise before eating, that
he should exercise in the morning, ... }, or (b) {that he can exercise before eating, that he
can exercise in the morning, ... }. And (28) would be true iff Bill knows a proposition in the
relevant set.
Which set is the one at issue in a standard us of (28)? To my ear, (28) sounds much more
like the deontic reading - Bill knows when he should exercise, not when he can exercise.
But the 'can' interpretation of infinitival constructions is made plausible by other examples.
It is prominent in non-attitudinal contexts like the following:
(29) a. One way to travel is by taking a bus.
b. I need something to stir the soup with.
These sentences intuitively express something like 'One way one can travel is by taking a
bus' and 'I need something that I can stir this soup with'. The 'can' reading of infinitives also
appears in some knowledge-wh attributions. S&W give the following example (2001: 425):
(30) Johns know where to find an Italian newspaper.
On a standard use, this would seem to mean that John knows that he (or that one) can find
an Italian newspaper at such-and-such place. We will discuss the modality of the infinitival
construction in more detail in section 4.1, but for now, we have the elements we need to
proceed to examine an Intellectualist account of know-how attributions.
3.2 The analogy with know-how attributions
Before looking at what the most plausible set of propositions would be to take as the de-
notation of 'how to swim', we should first think about how one might provide a general argu-
ment for Intellectualism on the basis of the considerations in the preceding section. S&W and
Stanley (Forthcoming) spend quite a bit of time discussing the semantics of knowledge-wh
attributions other than know-how attributions, so it seems that they must take their analyses of
the former to provide some argument or motivation for their analysis of the latter. What could
their reasoning be? A fairly uncharitable reading, though one that unites the arguments in the
papers just mentioned and papers by Paul Snowdon (2003) and D.G. Brown (1970), would
be this: 'S knows how to 4' attributes knowledge-that because all other attitude attributions
with wh-complements attribute knowledge-that.
But why is anyone supposed to be convinced by that 'because'? Anti-Intellectualists
never maintained that knowledge-that did not include knowledge of when Gladys exercises
or knowledge of where to buy an Italian newspaper, so if there is an objection to their view
coming from considerations about these sorts of knowledge-wh, there must be more premises
in play.
The most obvious suggestion is that there is an implicit appeal to the following principle
of linguistic methodology: All else being equal, give similar constructions similar analyses.
If 'S knows how to 0' counts as similar in the relevant sense to 'S knows when to 0' and 'S
knows how Gladys Os', then, if all else is equal, we should analyze 'S knows how to 0' along
the lines sketched in the preceding section. The anti-Intellectualist will protest here that all
else is not equal, or that the relevant constructions are not similar in the relevant sense. These
claims must be supported, and I will surveys some ways to do so below. For now, we may
simply observe that S&W and Stanley's strategy, if correctly characterized as above, requires
that there not be good reasons to give 'S knows how to 0' special treatment among the class
of knowledge-wh attributions.
3.3 A linguistic argument for Intellectualism
We can put the Intellectualist's strategy in the form of a more explicit argument that
makes clear the respects in which 'S knows how to 4' is supposed to be similar to other
attributions of knowledge-wh, and that thereby makes clear the options the anti-Intellectualist
has for objecting to the assimilation. I will represent this reasoning as proceeding in two
stages, focussing on a single example of know-how, practical knowledge of how to swim, for
simplicity. First, we argue that 'how to swim' denotes a set of propositions.
(SW1) In 'S knows how Bill swims', 'how Bill swims' denotes a set of propositions (viz.,
{p I 3w such that p = that Bill swims in way w}).
(SW2) In 'S knows where to swim', 'where to swim' denotes a set of propositions (viz.,
p I 3y such that p = that y is a place for S to swim}).
(SW3) 'S knows how to swim' has the same wh-complementizer, 'how', as in 'S knows
how Bill swims', and contains the same infinitival clause in its wh-complement, 'to
swim', as in 'S knows where to swim'.
(SW4) So, in 'S knows how to swim', 'how to swim' denotes a set of propositions.
We might think of the inference to (SW4) as relying on the intuitive syntactic similarities
between 'how to swim' and the pair of 'where to swim' and 'how Bill swims'. But we could
also fill out the reasoning a bit by saying that were 'how to swim' to denote something other
than a set of propositions, it would have to do so in virtue of having constituents that combined
to yield this other denotation. But the constituents of 'how to swim' are just 'how' and the
infinitival clause, and (SW1) and (SW2) show that neither's presence alone is sufficient for a
wh-complement to denote something besides a set of propositions.
Next, we extend a simple formal semantic treatment from 'knows how Bill swims' and
'knows where to swim' to 'knows how to swim'.
(SW5) In 'S knows how Bill swims' and in 'S knows where to swim', 'knows' denotes a
relation satisfied by S and a set of propositions P iff for some proposition q that is a
true member of P, S knows q.6
61 ignore the point, mentioned above, that we must place restrictions on the propositions that are candidates
for verifying attributions of knowledge-wh.
(SW6) In 'S knows how to swim', 'knows' denotes a relation satisfied by S and a set of
propositions P iff for some q that is a true member of P, S knows q.
(SW7) For someone to know how to do something is just for them to know a proposition of
a certain sort.
Premise (SW6) draws support from both (SW4) and (SW5). Assuming (SW4), 'how to
swim' denotes a set of propositions, so however 'knows' gets analyzed, it must express some
relation to the relevant set. The obvious thing to do is follow the pattern established by (SW5).
The conclusion simply relies on the fact that, in (SW6), the truth conditions of 'S knows how
to swim' are that S knows q, where q is a proposition of a certain sort. The truth-conditions
of sentences using 'knows how to' are then taken to tell us what it is to know how to do
something.
3.4 Possible responses to the linguistic argument
Is there a good way to object to the Intellectualist line of argument above? If we grant
premise (SW1), we are left with the following options for rejecting the argument.
(a) Deny (SW2), objecting to the analysis of infinitival wh-complements.
(b) Deny (SW3), objecting to the assumption that 'knows how to swim' contains the same
elements as are contained in other wh-complements like 'knows where to swim' and
'knows how Bill swims'.
(c) Reject the inference from (SWl)-(SW3) to (SW4).
(d) Reject the inference from (SW4) and (SW5) to (SW6).
(e) Reject the inference from (SW6) to (SW7).
It is not easy to see how one could pursue strategy (e). In order to clear the conceptual
space for such a move, one would have to sever the connection between the biconditional of
a theorist's compositional semantic analysis and the correct thesis about what it is to have a
certain property. I will not discuss this idea any further, though I think the strategy in question
is conceivable and therefore worth including on our list. In what follows I will focus only on
(a)-(d).
Let us consider first (a), which does not look particularly promising. There may be a
number of complaints to be raised about the syntactic analysis on which premise (SW2) rests,
complaints about whether the analysis has the sort of orthodoxy and plausibility necessary to
take philosophical hostages. But even though prominent linguists disagree about, for instance,
the interpretation (or even existence - see (Hornstein 1999)) of PRO, that does little to
support the anti-Intellectualist's view that knowing how to do something is special. We would
need some consideration relevant specifically to 'knows how to 0', not to infinitival wh-
complements in general. For further relevant discussion, see section 3.8.
Next, a brief word about strategy (b). To take this line, one might object to (SW3) by
trying to treat 'how' as part of the constituent 'knows how', rather than as part of a wh-
complement, and treating 'to swim' as a bare infinitive. But 'knows how' does not look like
a constituent:
(31) A: What does he know?
B: How to swim.
(32) A: *What does he know how?
B: To swim.
Alternatively, one might claim that 'how' in 'knows how to swim' is a different lexical item
than the 'how' in 'knows how Bill swims'. The claim seems rather implausible and unmoti-
vated, so I will not elaborate on it, but I have no conclusive reason to rule out its viability.
Strategy (c) warrants some consideration. The brief argument sketched above to get us
from (SW1)-(SW3) to (SW4) was the following: Given that 'how to swim' contains elements
whose behavior in other wh-complements contributes to those complements denoting sets
of propositions, they should, when combined, continue to make the same contributions to
determining a denotation. So 'how to swim' should denote the same sort of thing, a set of
propositions, as 'where to swim' and 'how Bill swims'. One could resist this inference by
accepting (SW3) but arguing that 'how to swim' contains some syntactic structure or lexical
item in addition to the material it shares with the other two complements. Suppose, for
example, that there is an operator that abstracts over PRO and results in the whole complement
denoting something of semantic type (e, (st, t)) instead of (st, t).
This strategy is closely tied to strategy (d), and could be taken on as a way to motivate
the rejection of the inference to (SW6). One could also pursue (d) without objecting to
premise (SW4), a tactic that would amount to admitting that the complement of 'knows'
denotes a set of propositions while simultaneously denying that 'knows' denotes a relation of
knowledge between thinkers and propositions in the relevant set. One could hold instead that
'knows' denotes a relation between thinkers and the sets of propositions themselves, not their
members. (Again, see section 3.8.) But let us focus on (c) a bit longer.
3.5 Strategy (c): Special treatment and the conjunction test
S&W offer two considerations that are supposed to discourage us from strategies like (c)
that would require us to apply some special treatment to 'knows how to 0' that would not
apply to 'knows how Bill Os' or 'knows where to 0'. The first consideration is supposed to
directly refute the claim that 'knows' has a different semantics or different sort of complement
in 'knows how to 0'. It appeals to the possibility of conjoining attributions of knowledge-how
and knowledge-that as in (33).
(33) John knows both that his mother hates facial twitches and how to make them. (2001:
431)
The idea is that such a sentence would be ungrammatical if the 'know how to' construction
required a different interpretation than the 'know that' construction. The jarring effect of
simultaneously invoking two interpretations of the same linguistic material (a device known
as "syllepsis") can be seen clearly in (34):
(34) *Roger Clemens walked one mile in the morning and two batters during the game.
Here the speaker would be attempting to use 'walked' in two different ways simultaneously,
and the result is an anomalous sentence. A longer-winded version is needed: Roger Clemens
walked one mile in the morning and walked two batters during the game.
If the claim of a special interpretation of 'knows' in 'knows how to' were correct, then
according to S&W, (33) ought to sound like (34). But there are several worries for the con-
junction test. First, while it may be useful as a heuristic, is not wholly reliable. To illustrate
with a germane example, 'knows' is ambiguous between the sense in which one knows an
individual and the sense in which one knows a fact. So if the test is wholly reliable, the
following example must be ungrammatical. But it is not.
(35) John knows each first-year linguist, each philosopher, and who's dating whom.
In fact, I find it superior to S&W's example, which sounds marginal to me (and to others, I
gather, e.g. Rumfitt (2003)). But we can set aside the dubious grammatical status of S&W's
conjunction. As linguist Craige Roberts (2009) writes, "the argument from conjunction is
not a strong one". For one thing, even according to Groenendijk and Stokhof's classic work,
'that'-complements and embedded questions have denotations of different semantic types.
Furthermore, "It has long been acknowledged in the linguistic literature, and discussed in
detail in Sag et al. (1985), that both that-complements and infinitival questions can be con-
joined with NPs." Roberts provides examples including the following, which I agree sound
grammatical:
(36) a. We asked her how to get home and several similar questions.
b. Mary knows where to find the safe and the combination to the lock on it.
c. His answer and how he pronounced it both surprised me.
Roberts acknowledges that one might object to the data by arguing that the apparent NPs
in examples like the ones above are really concealed questions. So, for instance, (36-b)
really means 'Mary knows where to find the safe and what the combination is to the lock
on it'. Roberts declines to comment further, but I think there are two points to note. First,
to defend the conjunction test, one would have to argue that the concealed-question strategy
works for every example like the ones in (36), and that is a claim too bold to simply be taken
as a premise in an argument for Intellectualism. Second, the strategy does not even seem
plausible for some of the examples above. 'John knows each first-year linguist' does not
seem to me to admit of a concealed-question reading. At the least, the reading on which John
is acquainted with each first-year linguist is strongly preferred. And (36-a) also does not seem
easily accommodated. What could the concealed-question reading possibly be? 'We asked
her how to get home and what several similar questions were'? This reading is impossible.
'We asked her how to get home and what the answers were to several similar questions'? This
reading is less obviously incorrect, but still does not seem very plausible. 'What is the answer
to the question of how I can get home?' does not express the same question as 'How can I get
home?' for at least the following reason: The former question but not the latter presupposes
that the question 'How can I get home?' has a unique answer. As an alternative attempt to
paraphrase (36-a), one could try 'We asked her how to get home and what an answer was to
several similar questions'. This still seems an unnatural paraphrase, and unlike (36-a) itself,
it has a reading on which the questioner was presupposing that the several questions shared
an answer.
Another worry about the conjunction test applies specifically to the strategy of Stanley
(Forthcoming). On his view, as well as on the views of many other authors, 'knows' does not
in fact have the same semantics in 'S knows that p' as it does in knowledge-wh attributions.
In 'S knows how to 0', the verb "relates persons, possible worlds, and embedded question se-
mantic values, which are functions from worlds to properties", not people and propositions.
The relation it expresses can then be given further analysis in terms of the ordinary proposi-
tional relation, but the fact remains that the semantic value of 'knows' is completely different
in 'S knows that p' and 'S knows wh...'.
So if Stanley's view is to be sustained, it must be that (a) the conjunction test refutes
the claim that 'knows' attributes propositional knowledge in 'S knows that p' and non-
propositional knowledge in 'S knows how to 0', since (33) is grammatical, but (b) the con-
junction test does not refute the claim that 'knows' expresses a relation to a proposition in
'S knows that p' and a relation to worlds and functions from worlds to properties (i.e. to
non-propositional entities) in 'S knows how to 0', even though (33) is grammatical.
It seems that Stanley must think that even if two verb-forms semantically express relations
to distinct sorts of entities, they will pass the conjunction test if one can be analyzed in terms
of the other. But consider some other examples:
(37) a. John ate the cake, and Bill, the ice cream.
b. *John ate, and Bill, the ice cream.
c. John laughed Mary off the dance floor, and Bill, Mary off the stage.
d. *John laughed, and Bill, Mary off the stage.
The intransitive use of 'ate' is presumably analyzable in terms of the transitive use, and the
transitive use of 'laughed' is presumably analyzable in terms of the intransitive use. The
following is at least as plausible as any reductive analysis of knowledge-wh in terms of
knowledge-that: x eats iff x eats something. 7 Even if there are details to quibble about,
an English speaker need not learn two distinct verbs in order to grasp both uses of 'laugh',
or both uses of 'eat'. So it seems that either we have another indication of the unreliability
70r perhaps, something in a sufficiently large quantity, as determined by the context. Normally, if John
intentionally ingests a spoonful of sugar shortly before dinnertime, one could not say 'John ate'. But in a food
shortage in which everyone's meals consisted solely of one spoonful of sugar, one could say that.
of the conjunction test, or the test refutes Stanley's own view, since, following the pattern
of (37), it should predict that if Stanley's view is correct, (33) is ungrammatical. Given the
Roberts-style examples above, the conservative conclusion is to take the present observations
as reinforcing the unreliability of the conjunction test.
One final worry about the conjunction test arises from the possibility (defended below)
that 'knows' is ambiguous, so that on one reading of 'S knows how to )', the sentence at-
tributes ordinary propositional knowledge to S, while on another reading, it attributes a spe-
cial, practical sort of knowledge. In that case, we would expect there to be a grammatical
reading of sentences like (33). Given this grammatical reading, we can expect the results of
the conjunction test to be unclear. For consider the following:
(38) John set his alarm and his cup on the table.
Is this sentence grammatical? It seems so - it says that John's alarm and cup were placed
by John on the table. But there is an interpretation of 'John set his alarm' on which 'set'
does not mean the same as 'placed'. On that interpretation of 'set', one cannot set a cup on
the table. So there should be an ungrammatical reading of (38). It seems to me that there
is, but it is difficult to hear this reading. Charity pushes one to interpret the sentence in the
grammatical way. The point for sentences like (33) is that the same effect may be interfering
with our judgments there. This would explain why some speakers find (33) acceptable, while
other feel uneasy about it - it may take some effort to interpret the sentence in a way that
renders it grammatically deviant.
While we have now seen some problems with the conjunction test, they have been prob-
lems with false negatives. Ungrammaticality does not always result when we run the test on
verb-forms with distinct semantic values. But in the cases we have looked at so far, every
time the test does produce an ungrammatical sentence, the relevant verb does indeed have
multiple semantic values. In testing other verbs, I have not found any false positives.
(39) a. *John caught a fish by the pond and a cold from his wife.
b. *John set his alarm for 7am and his cup on the table.
c. *John filed his toenails and the forms to get his passport.
I conclude that a negative result in S&W's conjunction test is at best a heuristic for in-
ferring an absence of multiple interpretations, but that a positive result offers good support
for the presence of an ambiguity. Since S&W's use of the test against strategy (c) was of the
former sort, it does not provide a strong objection. If independently motivated, therefore, one
could reasonably try to block argument (SW1)-(SW7) by giving a special semantic analysis
to 'knows' or to the complement clause in 'S knows how to #'.
3.6 Strategies (c) and (e): Truth-value judgments and cross-linguistic
evidence
The second tactic S&W employ against the special-treatment strategy is to emphasize that
there "is no basis in structure" for distinguishing 'knows how Bill rides a bicycle' from knowl-
edge attributions containing 'why'-complements, 'where'-complements, and so on (2001:
419). And similarly, there is no relevant syntactic difference between 'knows how Bill rides
a bicycle' and 'knows how to ride a bicycle'. Without a syntactic difference, there is no basis
for a semantic difference, so 'knows how to ride a bicycle' should be given the usual analysis
in terms of knowing a proposition.
There is an obvious rejoinder. Even if there are no considerations internal to contem-
porary syntactic theory of English for singling out 'knows how to 0', those are not the only
considerations one could marshall. Motivation for hypotheses about the semantically relevant
structure of a sentence can come from above. In fact, this mode of inference is illustrated even
by S&W's account of know-how. Their account has a feature completely unmotivated by the
structure of the sentences in question - based only on judgments of truth-values of vari-
ous sentences, they require for know-how that one's knowledge be under a "practical mode
of presentation" (see below for discussion). The point here is that judgments about sen-
tences containing 'knows how to' might reveal important facts about the sentences' seman-
tics, and comparing such judgments with the results of testing sentences containing 'knows
that', 'knows where', etc. might indicate important semantic differences. The argument that
"there is no basis in structure" for a distinction is therefore not a strong one.8
The point just made, besides being relevant to strategy (c), also bears on strategy (e). One
version of (e) would be to argue that the 'knows' verb required to make premise (SW6) true
does not mean the same as the 'knows' we use in ordinary 'knows that' attributions. The
Intellectualist might respond with the claim that there is no basis in contemporary linguistic
theories of English to support the ambiguity, but the import of that claim is significantly
deflated once we recognize that considerations in favor of an ambiguity might come in from
elsewhere. If such considerations do come in, so much the worse for a linguistic theory that
has ignored those considerations.
What sort of considerations might there be in favor of strategies (c) and (e), the strategies
on which 'S knows how to 0' are given a special semantic treatment? Note that the anti-
Intellectualist is interested primarily in knowledge of how to do things, and is interested in
the English locution 'knows how to' only insofar as it can shed light on know-how itself. One
might be pushed by this observation to look for evidence in other languages that contradicts
the syntactic and formal semantic claims appealed to in the argument above. Ian Rumfitt
(2003) has done just this, providing data from various languages. For instance, in Russian,
Rumfitt points out, completely distinct psychological verbs - umet' and znat' - are used for
know-how and for knowledge of facts or answers to questions. One uses znat' in saying that
one knows that one must swim and in saying that one knows why to vote for Putin, but one
uses umet' to say that one knows how to swim. A similar distinction occurs with the verb for
8Stanley makes a similar argument in his more recent paper: "All the intellectualist must show is that what-
ever complications exist for the semantics of embedded questions, the nature of PRO and the interpretation
of infinitives do not entail that (6) [a know-how attribution] should be given a distinct analysis than (5) and
(7) [other knowledge-wh attributions]." The mistake is in ignoring the fact that truth-value judgments could
themselves motivate one's analysis of know-how attributions.
learning - nauchit'sya for learning how to swim and uznat' for learning how Trotsky died.
Not only does Russian have these distinctions in verbs, but the know-how and learn-how
verbs can only be complemented by infinitival phrases, not by a 'chto'-clause (like English's
'that'-clause) or an embedded question (Rumfitt 2003: 164).
So there is an obvious inference we might draw from the Russian data. Given the distinc-
tion in verbs, we can infer that there really is something special about know-how. Its special
status is marked by dedicated verbs that translate 'knows how to' and 'learns how to', while
there are no special verbs for other kinds of knowledge-wh or learning-wh. This conclusion
is reinforced by Rumfitt's data from Latin, Greek, and French, each of which have special
constructions for attributing know-how. In French, for instance, one attributes the knowledge
of how to do something with 'savoir' plus an infinitive verb form, not with an embedded
question.
(40) I1 sait nager.
He knows to-swim
He knows how to swim.
(41) Jean sait conduire une voiture.
Jean knows to-drive a car.
Jean knows how to drive a car.
Rumfitt notes that one can add 'comment', the French equivalent of 'how', after 'savoir', but
the result is semantically distinct. (42), he says, means something like "Jean has solved the
problem of getting to drive a car", or "Jean knows in what particular manner to drive a car".
(42) Jean sait comment conduire une voiture.
Several informants have confirmed this for me, one glossing (42) as "Jean knows how a car
is driven" - the use of the passive in the gloss may be worth further thought.
In the face of Rumfitt's data, it has been suggested that the know-how attributions in the
languages just discussed have, despite surface appearances, embedded questions as comple-
ments (Stanley 2005), (Forthcoming). However, the claim is unlikely given the following
considerations. 9 As is well-known, wh-phrases (embedded questions included) are islands
- it is ungrammatical to move terms out of them. To see what this means, suppose Hannah
loves Alva's dog. We can say:
(43) a. Hannah loves what?
b. What does Hannah love?
c. Alva's dog is what Hannah loves.
But suppose Hannah gets compliments when she's walking Alva's dog. We can say (44-a),
but not (44-b) or (44-c).
(44) a. Hannah gets compliments when she's walking what?
b. *What does Hannah get compliments when she's walking?
c. *Alva's dog is what Hannah gets compliments when she's walking.
So if all attributions of know-how in French contained embedded wh-phrases, there would
be a uniform pattern of movement possibilities. Whether or not the word 'comment' were
visible on the surface, it would be ungrammatical to move a term out of the phrase following
'savoir'. However, this is not borne out, as movement is possible out of 'savoir'+infinitive,
but impossible out of 'savoir comment'+infinitive. 10
(45) a. Qu'est-ce que Jean sait construire?
What-is-it that Jean knows to-build?
What does Jean know how to build?
b. *Qu'est-ce que Jean sait comment construire?
What-is-it that Jean knows how to-build?
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9For further discussion of Stanley's strategy, see section 5.2.
1'Thanks to Valentine Hacquard and Bernadette Rouyer for judgments.
(46) a. Qu'est-ce que Jean sait faire?
What-is-it that Jean knows to-do?
What does Jean know how to do?
b. *Qu'est-ce que Jean sait comment faire?
What-is-it that Jean knows how to-do?
Similar data from Russian ought to be collected, 11 but Rumfitt's observations already seem
quite solid.
I began the discussion of non-English locutions with the thought that they might have as
equal claim to reveal the nature of know-how as 'S knows how to 0' does, so that they might
provide us with valuable evidence about our subject matter. But we might now take the above
discussion as a cue to reconsider the analyses of English. Perhaps the truth is exactly the
opposite of what Stanley suggests: Rather than French having a hidden wh-complementizer,
maybe English has a fake wh-complementizer. (This would bring us back to strategy (b).) I
think following up on this thought a bit is worthwhile. While the results are ultimately un-
helpful for anti-Intellectualists, they are interesting, and our discussion will be an opportunity
to correct some mistakes in the literature.
3.7 Island effects and wh-complements in English
Consider the pattern of movement possibilities that results from applying the test of island
constraints to English constructions.
(47) a. Hannah knows how she can ride a bicycle.
b. *What does Hannah know how she can ride?
c. *A bicycle is what Hannah knows how she can ride.
(48) a. Hannah knows how Bill rides a bicycle.
11 So far I have gathered data from only one informant, but she reported that Russian features the same pattern
as French and English.
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b. *What does Hannah know how Bill rides?
c. *A bicycle is what Hannah knows how Bill rides.
Now compare the above examples to the results of testing the crucial case, the case that,
according to the Intellectualist argument, has no significant differences from the others.
(49) a. Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle.
b. What does Hannah know how to ride?
c. A bicycle is what Hannah knows how to ride.
These sentences are totally natural, a result in tension with the view that the correct linguistic
analysis of 'knows how to' ascriptions parallels other ascriptions of knowledge-wh. 12 One
might reply that that the difference in grammaticality between (49-b)/(49-c) and (47-b)/(47-c)
or (48-b)/(48-c) could somehow be accounted for by the fact that (49) contains a phonologi-
cally null pronoun, whereas the others have an overt pronoun ('she' or 'Bill'). If a peculiarity
of PRO-constructions licensed movement out of what would otherwise be islands, then one
could escape the conclusion that 'knowing how' is special. What would be special would just
be constructions with PRO. (At least, in English. Notice that the present view would leave the
French data and their parallel to English unexplained.) However, this hypothesis is refuted by
(50), in which the pronoun is null but movement is unacceptable.
(50) a. Hannah knows why to ride a bicycle. (E.g., to avoid traffic jams and get some
exercise.)
b. *What does Hannah know why to ride?
c. *A bicycle is what Jean knows why to ride.
These data look like a vindication of the otherwise implausible thought that 'how' in 'knows
how to 0' is a fake wh-complementizer, so that 'how to 0' is not really an embedded question.
12One might worry that 'how' simply tends to produce weaker islands than other wh-words. But all I need is
the contrast between (48-b) and (47-b), both of which contain 'how'.
However, Jason Stanley, who reports having independently noted data like the above (p.c.,
3/7/08), resists the conclusion that there is any problem for Intellectualism here.
In his (Forthcoming), Stanley makes two claims. First, that complements of know-how
constructions really are scope islands, contrary to the appearance in (49). Second, that the
apparent scope properties of 'knows how to' also occur in 'wonders how to 0', 'asks how to
0', and 'figure out how to 0'. Stanley is incorrect in his first claim, and while the upshot of
his second claim is correct, his discussion requires elaboration.
Regarding (49) and (50), Stanley offers the following pair to show that know-how con-
structions are scope islands:
(51) *John knows how to climb a mountain. It is over there.
(52) John plans to climb a mountain. It is over there.
The claim is that there is no de re reading of "a mountain" in (51), in constrast to a construc-
tion like (52). However, I find (51) perfectly acceptable. More importantly, there are obvious
de re readings of the following:
(53) a. John knows how to climb every mountain in the area.
b. John knows how to climb many mountains in this range.
c. John knows how to climb exactly two mountains.
d. John knows how to climb at least one mountain.
For instance, (53-d) naturally invites the question 'Which one?', and can be followed up with
'It is over there'. The only other evidence Stanley provides for the claim that 'knows how
to 0' is an island is that Google returned far fewer results in a search for 'How many do you
know how to' than for 'How many do you want to' (21 vs. over 18,000). But this is of little
relevance, since the following is obviously grammatical and easily interpretable:
(54) How many mountains around here do you know how to climb?
So 'knows how to 0' does not appear to be a scope island after all, just as I argued above.
Stanley's treatment of the second issue rests on the observation that the following are
perfectly grammatical:
What does John wonder how to do?
(56) What did John ask how to do?
Stanley assumes that 'wonder' and 'ask' are relations to propositions, and hence that the
special scope properties of 'knows how to 0', granting for the sake of argument that they
are genuine, do nothing to show that know-how is not propositional. But the examples do
not show what Stanley takes them to, since 'wonder' and 'ask' do not express relations to
propositions. It simply makes no sense to think of a proposition being the thing that John
was wondering or asking - one does not wonder or ask a proposition. And this is not just a
matter of it being ungrammatical to say 'John wonders that p' or a matter of there being no
reading of 'John asks that p' equivalent to (56). It is perfectly grammatical to say 'John was






I told John that w was a way for him to ski.
Ah, good. #He was wondering that.
I told John that w was a way for him to ski.
Ah, good. #He was asking that.
A related point is made by the following.
(59) A:
B:
What does John wonder?
How to ski.
(55)
B: #That w is a way for him to ski.
(60) A: What did John ask?
B: How to ski.
B: #That w is a way for him to ski.
Since these constructions that allow movement out of their wh-complements are constructions
which do not express relations to propositions, the fact that such movement is also permitted
in 'knows how to 0' appears to undermine the very position Stanley takes himself to be de-
fending. It would suggest that know-how is not propositional either. The pattern of evidence
is more complex than that, however, since movement is also permitted in other constructions
like the following, the first of which is noted by Stanley:
(61) a. What did John figure out how to do?
b. What did John teach you how to do?
If we assume that 'figure out' and 'teach' always express relations to propositions, then (61)
indicates that while it is constructions of the form V + 'how to 0' that possess special move-
ment properties, expressing a non-propositional relation is not necessary to explain those
movement properties. That it is not sufficient either is shown by the following.
(62) a. Hannah wonders why Gladys exercises.
b. *What does Hannah wonder why Gladys does?
(63) A: What does Hannah wonder?
B: Why Gladys exercises.
B: #That Gladys exercises in order to lose weight.
(64) a. Hannah asked when to stop by for a visit.
b. *What did Hannah ask when to do?
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(65) A: What did Hannah ask?
B: When to stop by for a visit.
B: #That she should stop by for a visit at 7pm.
'Wonders' and 'asks' are not relations to propositions regardless of what sort of wh-complement
they have, but usual island effects appear in some such constructions. So constructions that
express non-propositional relations may fail to resemble 'knows how to 4' in island effects.
We have shown that, as Stanley concluded, island properties of 'knows how to 0' do not
show that the construction attributes a relation to a proposition. But we have not yet directly
answered the question of whether 'knows how to 0' does attribute a relation to a proposition.
We have seen that 'wonder' and 'ask' must be semantically analyzed as relating people to
question-denotations, so considerations of uniformity suggest that we do the same for any
verb with an embedded question as complement. So we should treat 'figure out how to 0',
'ask why Gladys Os', and 'knows how to 0' as all relating people to question-denotations.
If desired, we can provide further reductive analyses to explain, e.g., that one figures out a
question-denotation iff one figures out a certain proposition. But whether to provide a similar
reduction for other verbs would require philosophical debate on a case-by-case basis. Such
a reduction appears impossible for 'wonders' and 'asks', but what about 'knows' + wh, for
which there is the familiar counterpart 'knows that' construction?
3.8 Non-propositionality for knowledge-wh in general
Jonathan Schaffer (2007) has argued that knowledge-wh cannot be analyzed as a relation
to a proposition. Suppose John is quite capable of visually distinguishing George Bush from
Dick Cheney, though he cannot easily distinguish George Bush from Will Ferrell, a George
Bush impersonator. John is watching television and sees George Bush delivering a speech.
Schaffer endorses the intuitive judgments that (JS 1) is true while (JS2) is false.
(JS 1) John knows whether Bush or Cheney is on TV. (True)
(JS2) John knows whether Bush or Ferrell is on TV. (False)
But if knowing-whether consists in knowing the proposition that answers the 'whether'-
question, then since Bush is on television, both (JS1) and (JS2) are true iff John knows
that Bush is on TV. This is inconsistent with the divergent judgments, so Schaffer rejects
the supposition that knowing-whether consists in knowing the proposition that answers the
'whether'-question. He generalizes the resulting view to all knowledge-wh.
Schaffer's view is that knowledge-wh is a three-place relation to proposition and a question-
denotation, though he does not give any argument for including a proposition as a relatum
rather than simply treating knowledge-wh as a relation to a question-denotation. Doing the
latter is supported by the point above about uniformity with verbs like 'wonder' and 'ask',
so I take Schaffer's argument, if sound, to be an argument for treating knowledge-wh as a
two-place relation to a question-denotation. There is a further aspect of Schaffer's view that
I reject - he concludes that not only knowledge-wh but also 'S knows that p' has a question
as a relatum. The argument for that claim, however, rests on the conjunction test discussed
earlier, which I do not find persuasive, so I take the upshot of Schaffer's data to be restricted
to knowledge-wh.13
Is Schaffer's argument sound? There are worries that turn on the exact semantic analysis
of knowledge-wh, but Schaffer answers some of these in his (2009), and the argument remains
plausible in my view. So what does it show about know-how? It does not show that know-
how has special features that distinguish it from other sorts of knowledge-wh, but it does
show that the correct semantic analysis of knowledge-wh, including know-how, should treat
it as a relation to a question-denotation, not a proposition. Is this conclusion inconsistent with
Intellectualism? Not intuitively, but it is worth looking at the theses we carefully distinguished
earlier.
13The data may extend to figuring-out-wh, explaining-wh, or other similar constructions, but discussion of
this would take us too far afield.
Thesis (25), our best regimentation of Intellectualism, is a quantified biconditional thesis
with 'x knows p' on the right-hand side. For some appropriate replacement of 'F', it entails
that John knows how to swim iff for some proposition p such that F(p), John knows p. Schaf-
fer's argument shows that this consequence of (25) is false. For consider the parallel claim
about knowing-wh: John knows whether Bush or Ferrell is on TV iff for some proposition
p such that F(p), John knows p. Suppose 'F' is replaced with the most plausible candidate
property, the property of answering the question of whether Bush or Ferrell is on TV. Then we
have the consequence that John knows whether Bush or Ferrell is on TV iff he knows a propo-
sition that answers the question of whether Bush or Ferrell is on TV. But we also have the
consequence that John knows whether Bush or Cheney is on TV iff he knows a proposition
that answers the question of whether Bush or Cheney is on TV. But since Bush is on TV, this
makes knowing whether Bush or Ferrell is on TV materially equivalent to knowing whether
Bush or Cheney is on TV, which provides a reductio of a knowing-whether analog to (25). If
the analog is false because knowledge-wh is irreducibly a relation to a question-denotation,
then unless know-how and not other knowledge-wh is a relation to a proposition, (25) is false
for the same reason. Thus if we took (25) to be our standard statement of Intellectualism,
then, unintuitively, Schaffer's view would be inconsistent with Intellectualism.
This provides further reason to be skeptical that a formal construal of Intellectualism
along the lines explored in section 2 will be helpful. What we want is a thesis that concerns
the relationship between know-how and knowledge of the kind we attribute with 'S knows that
p', but we do not want to assume that the latter expresses a relation to a proposition. I had
already suggested as much (in section 2.2), since even if 'S knows that p' were not a relation
to a proposition but had a Russellian analysis instead, the debate over Intellectualism would
not seem to be resolved. Schaffer's position reinforces this conclusion - even if know-how
is non-propositional and 'S knows that p' is propositional, that does not mean that the two
are of different kinds in the relevant respect. We may not want to define the relevant kinds
in terms of propositionality. Know-how might have none of the features anti-Intellectualists
have attributed to it and have used to motivate their position, and might instead share crucial
properties with knowledge-that. See section 5.1 below for a detailed discussion of these
features, which provides an illustration of how to distinguish kinds of knowledge without
using the propositionality of their relata to do so.
3.9 Learning-to and learning-how-to
Although data regarding island effects and wh-complements turned out not to reveal any-
thing about knowing how to do things, the datum remains that know-how is singled out in
some languages to receive its own dedicated verb or linguistic construction. So there is some
purely linguistic data to indicate that know-how is special in some respect. It would reinforce
the case if we could find some similar evidence from English, for instance, if English had a
distinction that paralleled the French distinction between 'savoir comment faire' and 'savoir
faire'.
There is, in fact, an English construction in which 'knows' is complemented by an infini-
tival phrase without a wh-complementizer.
(66) John knows to swim for exercise.
However, 'knows to )' does not express the same thing as 'savoir faire'. Rather than attribut-
ing the sort of know-how of interest to anti-Intellectualists, it seems to attribute knowledge of
some deontic proposition. Suppose that John's doctor has advised him to get some exercise,
but that John is worried about injuring himself while exercising. His doctor, who considers
swimming to be a quite safe way of exercising, instructs John to swim, and John correctly
takes him to be a reliable source. In this situation, (66) could be used to report what John has
come to know. A rough paraphrase might be 'John knows that he should swim for exercise'. 14
14There is one other construction involving 'knows' that is of some interest, in which the verb is comple-
mented simply by a term designating an activity or action. Such sentences may be familiar from a 1989-1990
ad campaign starring multi-talented athlete Bo Jackson: "Bo knows baseball. Bo knows football." To say that
x knows V-ing is not to say that x possesses a distinctively practical sort of knowledge about V-ing, but it is
unclear exactly what kind of knowledge is required. The construction's form suggests acquaintance knowledge,
i
Now, although (66) does not provide the data point that an anti-Intellectualist might want,
we need not look far. For we can note that English possesses two 'learns' locution. We can
say both of the following:
(67) a. John learned how to swim.
b. John learned to swim.
On one reading, the latter is not particularly relevant, since it expresses that John has ac-
quired knowledge of the sort attributed by (66). To bring out this deontic reading, consider
again the situation in which John's doctor has instructed him to swim. But the deontic read-
ing is clearly not the most natural reading of (67-b), and the one that will more likely have
occurred to the reader is much more interesting. On this latter interpretation, (67-b) expresses
something more like (67-a). But there is a distinction between the two claims. 15
If one reads an instructional book about swimming, one might (at least in an unusual
context) be described as having learned how to swim. But one has not learn to swim. Or
suppose John, who is extremely clumsy, has been reading about mountaineering this week,
and has memorized the instructions for tying a clove-hitch. In response to the question "What
did you do this week?", it would be false for John to reply with "I learned to tie clove-hitches",
though true to reply with "I learned how to tie clove-hitches". Normally, the latter would
suggest the former, but there is no entailment. Compare the following two exchanges.
(68) J: I learned how to tie a clove-hitch today.
Q: Oh, can you show me how?
J: Well, I don't know if I can actually do it - I've never tried.
(69) J: I learned to tie clove-hitches today.
although ordinary knowledge of facts seems to be sufficient - if John is a life-long sports reporter who never
played a game in his life, we might still say "John knows baseball!"
15Stanley (Forthcoming) has independently noticed these two locutions, but mistakenly claims that there is
no difference in usage between them.
Q: Oh, can you show me how?
J: Well, I don't know if I can actually do it - I've never tried.
John's response in (69) seems to me markedly worse than in (68), revealing that 'learned to'
is stronger than 'learned how to'. The point is reinforced by contrasting (70-a) and (70-b).
(70) a. #I haven't learned how to swim yet, but I've learned how to do it.
b. I haven't learn to swim yet, but I've learned how to do it.
The second sentence is not contradictory, even if in normal contexts one would assume that
someone who has learned how to swim has learned to swim. The former sentence is contra-
dictory.
The distinction I am pointing out, which has somehow been missed in the literature thus
far, bears on know-how in a simple way: If there is a distinction between kinds of learning,
then we can expect a similar distinction between kinds of knowledge. Learning is to knowing
as acquiring is to having, so to know whatever one learns by learning to 0 is not just to know
what one learns by learning how to 0. If this is right, then it is a mere accident that the
surface grammar of 'knows how' does not provide a way to make this distinction explicitly.
And recall: That it is an accident is supported by the cross-linguistic data highlighted by
Rumfitt. 'Savoir'+infinitive versus 'savoir comment'+infinitive is a distinction we would
expect, paralleling the difference between 'learn to' and 'learn how to'.
We have now seen reason to think that there is a kind of know-how that is special enough
to warrant distinctive linguistic locutions. This kind of know-how stands out from other
knowledge-wh, none of which receives its own special locution in English or any other lan-
guage I am aware of. This casts considerable doubt on an attempt to draw weighty philosoph-
ical conclusions about know-how through comparison with 'knows when', 'knows where',
and so on. It also provides a motivation for responses (c) and (d) to the linguistic argument
for Intellectualism. We will pursue this at length in section 5.2.
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Our new project for the moment is to learn more about the kind of know-how correspond-
ing to 'learns to', 'savoir faire', etc.. A case for Intellectualism might still be made if all
the features of this practical sort of know-how can be explained in terms of ordinary knowl-
edge of facts. Perhaps this know-how is special, a special kind of knowledge-that. It would
be knowledge-that nonetheless. Before looking in detail at this possibility, I want to more
carefully explore the sort of interpretation of 'S knows how to 0' that an Intellectualist might
suggest.
4 Intellectualism and ordinary knowledge-that
4.1 More on infinitival modality
We have seen analyses of 'S knows how Bill swims' and of 'S knows where to swim', and
we have seen an argument that since these attribute knowledge-that, so does 'S knows how to
swim'. But we have not yet been totally clear on what proposition is supposed to be known
when someone has practical knowledge of how to swim. The most detailed recent proposal
is that of S&W, so I will focus on their view in what follows.
Recall that infinitival constructions are generally thought to admit of two interpretations.
One, a deontic interpretation, we have already set aside. As S&W say, on the other reading of
infinitives, "they express some kind of possibility. On this reading, a use of 'to F' expresses
something like 'can F' " (2001: 424). As for the other elements of [how [PRO to 4 t]], we
have said that 'how' indicates that the propositions in the denoted set are propositions about
ways of 4ing, and we have said that PRO can be thought of as a silent counterpart of 'he' or
'she'.
Putting these parts together, S&W's account tells us that on the relevant interpretation of
[how [PRO to 0 t]], it denotes a set of propositions of the following sort: { that he can 0 in
way wl, that he can 0 in way w2, ... }. Adding to our account of knowledge-wh that there
are some contextual restrictions on which propositions suffice for knowledge-wh (we want to
rule out, for instance, the proposition that S can by 4ing), we have the result that 'S knows
how to 0' is true iff S knows one of the contextually relevant propositions in that set.
Interestingly, this result is not what S&W go on to endorse. Instead, they make two
notable moves without comment. First, they suspend the use of 'can', despite having just
noted in the passage quoted above that infinitives admit of a 'can' reading. Instead of 'can',
they turn to 'could' (2001: 425). Second, they then quickly suspend the use of 'could'.
Instead of 'S could 1 in way w', they begin exclusively using 'w is a way for S to 0'. But they
give no argument in support of this substitution. Perhaps they think that none is needed.
But, first of all, it is rather obscure what it means to say that w is a way for S to 0. Why not
say that S can 0 in way w or S could 0 in way w? The shift from their initial and more intuitive
gloss of the infinitive's modality should be motivated by some argument and accompanied by
some explanation of how the new locution differs. S&W provide none. Second, and more
importantly, 'for S to 0' simply contains, rather than explains, the infinitival construction
that a semantics for know-how attributions ought to explain. If we are to be convinced that
Intellectualism is correct, we should be given an explicit characterization of what propositions
one knows when one knows how to do something. If no propositions can be found knowledge
of which plausibly constitutes knowledge how to 0, the case for Intellectualism will be left
rather unconvincing. So if there is some modality involved in the propositions alleged to be
what one knows in knowing how to 4, the account must spell out what that modality is rather
than hide it in a new construction.
Though S&W do not provide an explanation of what their preferred gloss of the for-
infinitival construction is supposed to amount to, I have suggested that it should be under-
stood in terms of the original glosses with the modals 'can' or 'could'. I think this is intuitive,
but tellingly, it is also an uncontroversial view in the linguistic literature. Hackl and Nis-
senbaum (2003) for instance open their paper on for-infinitivals by noting that they admit of
two interpretations, one corresponding to 'should' and one corresponding to 'could'. Given
the authoritative status with which S&W regard standard views in linguistics, I assume that
they do not have their own unorthodox theory of the constructions in question.
They do provide one citation when first shifting to the locution they prefer. But consulting
the passage the point to, from D.G. Brown's paper, we only find further reason to stick with
'can' or 'could': To know how to V is "to know of some course of action only that it is a way
of V-ing, that is to say a way in which one can V, or in which it is possible to V. It is to know
of it only that by doing that thing one can V" (1970: 240, emphasis is Brown's). LIke S&W,
Brown uses 'is a way of V-ing', but he obviously thinks this is to be explained in terms of a
way one can V.
Another odd effect of moving to 'w is a way for x to 0' is that it distorts the form one
would naturally expect for a sentence stating an answer to the question of how to 4. Recall
that the structure is [how [PRO to 4 t]], where 'how' is moved from the position marked with
't'. Before movement, the structure is [PRO to 0 how]. As suggested earlier, an intuitive
way to think about such question-constructions is to think of the question-word as marking
the blank that should be filled in in an appropriate answer. Given our assumptions about
PRO and the infinitive, appropriate answers to the question of how to 1 should thus be of the
following sort: x can/could 4 in way w. Why front 'w'? The natural gloss leaves w where
the question-word originates - the natural answer to 'How does Bill O?' is not 'w is the way
Bill Os', but 'Bill Os in way w' (as in 'Bill swims by doing the backstroke'). Likewise, the
natural answer to the question of how to 1 should be something of the form '... 0 in way w.'
Furthermore, the S&W gloss cannot be extended to the construction 'John knows to swim for
exercise' - it would be nice if the most accurate gloss of the infinitival complement in that
sentence could be the same as the gloss in 'how to swim'. (I briefly discussing knowing-to-4
again in section 3.9.)
It is hard to see what reason S&W might have had for shifting to the for-locution in the
first place. But once we take note of the unwarranted shift, we see that the very theories S&W
appeal to predict that 'S knows how to 0' has a reading on which it entails that S can 0. As
I will discuss later, they must avoid the latter if their objections to Ryle's account of know-
how are to stand up - they claim that "As Ginet and others have pointed out, ascriptions of
knowledge-how do not even entail ascriptions of the corresponding abilities" (2001: 416).
And there is obviously a close connection between abilities and 'can'. Independent of this
connection, we can make a few observations about the correct understanding of the infinitive
in 'how to 0'.
It will not do to say that the modality of the relevant sense of 'can' or 'could' is merely
logical, metaphysical, or nomological possibility. Suppose that for me to know how to fly
would just be for me to know that it is logically possible that I fly in a certain contextually
relevant way. Well, I could fly in all sort of ways, as far as logical possibility goes, and I
know that. What might be a contextually salient way of flying? Perhaps by flapping one's
appendages. Or by doing this [demonstrating by moving my arms as if I were flying]. If the
atmosphere and the laws of physics were quite different, I would fly by doing this. I know
that, but I do not know how to fly. I also don't know how to run a mile in three minutes, but it
is compatible with the laws of nature that I should have run a mile in three minutes by having
incredible strength and endurance and exerting full effort. And I know that.
S&W provide their own counterexample to their proposal: S knows that that [demon-
strating a passing bicycle-rider's way of riding] is a way for her to ride a bicycle, but she
does not know how to ride a bicycle. Suppose we gloss this as: She could ride a bicycle by
doing that. The result, even if stronger than logical or metaphysical possibility, is still inad-
equate. Perhaps S&W have been simply not looked hard enough, and perhaps some other
proposition of the form 'I could ride a bicycle in way w', with the modal interpreted in the
same way, suffices for me to know how to ride a bicycle. Well, perhaps, but that claim is not
particularly pre-theoretically plausible, nor does it appear plausible in light of the fact that no
Intellectualist has ever suggested a decent substitute proposition of that sort.
This pushes us toward the idea that the sort of modality involved in the infinitival con-
structions in know-how claims really must be glossed with 'can'. For doing so lets us avoid
the counterexamples just discussed. If I know that I can 0 in a certain way, then it is true that
I can 0 in that way, and hence true that I can 4. If I cannot fly, it is false that I can fly in way
w and hence false that I know that I can fly in way w, and hence false that I know how to fly.
Similarly for running a mile in three minutes and for bicycle riding.
S&W suggest a different way of defending Intellectualism from the straightforward coun-
terexamples above. In the next section, I will discuss their strategy and explain why it does not
present an adequate alternative to using 'can' in the account of the propositions knowledge of
which is supposed to constitute know-how.
4.2 Practical modes of presentation
In response to the objection that someone might know that that is a way for her to ride a
bicycle without knowing how to ride a bicycle, S&W introduce a further component to their
analysis. Someone knows how to ride a bicycle iff for some contextually relevant way w,
she knows that w is a way for her to ride a bicycle, and knows it under a practical mode of
presentation (hereafter, PMP).
I will offer a few criticisms of PMPs, but the first is fairly obvious. Weak interpretations
of the modality of infinitival constructions faced counterexamples that could be avoided by
understanding the modality in terms of 'can'. S&W reject this gloss, and when their proposal
in terms of for faces the same counterexamples, they try to avoid them by bringing in PMPs.
We should obviously be suspicious that this is just a covert way of sneaking 'can' back into
the analysis of know-how under another name. Others have also worried that PMPs sneak
something distinctly anti-Intellectualist into the analysis of know-how - see, for instance,
John Koethe (2002), Sgaravatti and Zardini (2008), and Rosefeldt (2004). But the worry
takes on a new aspect in light of the linguistic considerations in favor of analyzing infinitival
modality with 'can'.
Ideally, we would use S&W's explanation of PMPs to assess their assumption that know-
ing a proposition under a PMP does not entail that the individual can perform the relevant
action. Unfortunately, we are told very little about PMPs, and given only minimal elaboration
by Stanley (Forthcoming). We are supposed to think of them on analogy with first-personal
modes of presentation, as being associated with certain distinctive dispositional properties,
but as being nonetheless just one way to know a proposition.
We are not even given the materials to determine whether PMPs suffice to allow Intellec-
tualism to escape the counterexamples discussed in the section above. Take our bicyclist S
who knows that that is a way for her to ride a bicycle. Why does she not know how to ride
a bicycle? It is far from obvious that she needs only to entertain the proposition under a dif-
ferent mode of presentation, so to show that PMPs solve the problem, S&W need to explain
how. It seems instead that they simply take PMPs to be whatever bridges the gap between
their original account and an account that provides sufficient conditions for know-how. There
are actually two questions here that we need answers to: (a) Are there such things as PMPs?
(b) Do PMPs allow Intellectualism to avoid the counterexamples above? And we are given
justification for a positive answer to neither. Alva Nod (2005) puts the worry here particularly
bluntly: S&W's reasoning seems to be that since Intellectualism is true, and since Intellectu-
alism would be refuted by counterexamples unless PMPs solved the problem, PMPs do solve
the problem. This is unsatisfactory.
Another worry, or perhaps simply a puzzling aspect of S&W's Intellectualism, is that
the PMP requirement for know-how is totally unmotivated by any syntactic data. In their
arguments against giving know-how any special semantic treatment, they object that there "is
no basis in structure" for doing so (2001: 419). If that objection carries any weight, it carries
equal weight against the claim that know-how requires a PMP. For how does that requirement
come to be imposed? There appears to be no element in the structure of 'S knows how to
0' that is responsible. The complementizer 'how' and the constituent [PRO to 0 t] appear in
other constructions that do not attribute knowledge under a practical mode of presentation.
(Consider 'S knows how Bill swims' and 'S knows why to swim'.)
Similarly, S&W say that their view "is just that the standard linguistic account of the
syntax and semantics of embedded questions is correct" (2001: 431), and the first benefit of
their view that they cite is that "it is the account entailed by current theories about the the
syntax and semantics of the relevant constructions" (2001: 440). But their account appeals
in a crucial way to machinery that is no part of current theories of the syntax and semantics
of knowledge-wh. I take this to indicate that S&W are more comfortable than they otherwise
appear with the strategy of using truth-value judgments to drive one's philosophical theorizing
in ways independent of any syntactic data.
The fact that the PMP requirement for know-how contravenes the spirit of the rest of
S&W's theory does not mean that it should be rejected. But unless it accommodates the
intuitions that motivate its introduction, it will have little to recommend it. Nor does the
lack of explanation of how PMPs work show that no such explanation could be given. But
there are even better reasons to be skeptical, namely that PMPs do not seem to be modes of
presentation at all.
The amnesiac Rudolph Lingens is lost in the Stanford library, and is unable to find the
way out despite having read a complete biography of himself, including the fact that Rudolph
Lingens is standing in east wing of the Stanford library. If Lingens knows the proposition
that Lingens is in the east wing, why can he not get out of the library? One intuitive answer
is that he is not thinking about Lingens in the right way. If he thought that Lingens was
in the east wing while thinking of himself as Lingens, then he would know where he was
(and thereby which direction the exit was). The notion of thinking of a person as oneself is
supposed to be captured by the notion of a first-personal or de se mode of presentation. (See
John Perry (2000) and David Lewis (1979).) Modes of presentation are ways of thinking
about individuals or entertaining facts.
In this case Lingens has a problem with self-identification as well as self-location in
space. The two are easily separable, of course. Someone in Cambridge might be thinking
that Cambridge was cold, but leave his home coatless because he was thinking that "here"
was Pasadena. Or, in another of Perry's cases, he might know that his meeting was at noon
but remain in his office at noon, thinking that "now" was 11:00. Again, the intuitive motiva-
tion for saying that there is a special mode of presentation missing in these cases is just that
while each individual knows that the relevant property holds of the place or time in question,
he seems to be failing in one respect: he is not thinking about the place in the "here"-way or
the time in the "now"-way.
Now, if PMPs are to be motivated by analogy with other modes of presentation, we would
expect an absence of know-how to be intuitively explicable in a way parallel to the explanation
of ignorance of one's identity or location in time or space. But we do not find this. Bill knows
how to wiggle his ears, while Nina does not. But Nina knows that contracting such and such
muscles repeatedly is a way for her to wiggle her ears, and she knows that that [demonstrating
Bill's ear-wiggling] is a way for her to wiggle her ears. What is Nina missing? According to
S&W's theory, the problem is just that Nina is not thinking in the right way about the relevant
way of wiggling - if she thought in a different way about that way of wiggling, she and Bill
would both know how to wiggle their ears. This claim simply has no plausibility at all.
Perhaps Intellectualists could let PMPs be something quite different from other modes of
presentation. They could say that when one knows under a PMP that w is way for her to 4,
this is not a matter of her thinking about w or Oing in the right way. Perhaps a PMP should not
be understood as a way of thinking something at all. But then what is it? We know that it is a
way in which one can be related by knowledge to a proposition, that being so related suffices
for know-how, and that being so related involves some connections to some dispositions. But
this is not a theory.
To reinforce the point that PMPs must be better explained and justified in order to play
any role theory of know-how, I now want to introduce an analogy. The orthodox view on
acquaintance-knowledge, the sort of knowledge we attribute by saying 'John knows Bill', is
that it is non-propositional. However, we might entertain the following view: x knows y iff x
knows that y exists, and knows it under a mode of presentation of acquaintance (AMP).
It might be objected that most people know that George Bush exists, but very few people
know George Bush. However, this objection can be blocked by asserting that one can only
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know that George Bush exists under an AMP by meeting George Bush in person, talking to
him on the phone, or something similar. In this way AMPs resemble certain demonstrative
modes of presentation: to think that that guy is tall, it is not sufficient to think that George
Bush is tall, even if that guy is George Bush. Or to think that this guy [on the other end of the
phone] is loud, it is not sufficient to think that George Bush is loud, even if this guy is George
Bush. Similarly, most people simply have not encountered Bush in the right circumstances to
allow them to know that he exists under an AMP.
It might be further objected that some people know George Bush but do not know that
George Bush exists - John, for instance, met Bush but was introduced to him by a prankster
who told him "This is Vladimir Putin". Having never heard of Bush, John cannot be said to
know that George Bush exists, although he knows Bush. Again, AMPs would allow us to
block the objection. Anyone who has met Bush knows under some modes of presentation but
not others that Bush exists. The fact that they would not assent to 'George Bush exists' is
independent of whether they know the proposition the sentence expresses under an AMP.
I suspect that no philosopher will be convinced by the above account, despite the fact
that AMPs are portrayed as analogous in various respects to other modes of presentation.
The proposal above about acquaintance knowledge is completely unconvincing because we
have no intuitive grip on what is to think that someone exists under a mode of presentation
of acquaintance, and because questions like the following are left unanswered: Why can all
and only people who know Bush think that Bush exists under an AMP? Why aren't AMPs
simply a way to illicitly rely on the traditional idea about acquaintance-knowledge - that
knowing an individual involves having participated in some fairly direct causal interaction
with that individual - while eliminating any relevance for the alleged propositional aspect
of the knowledge? Why is the proposal an explanation of the intuitions that motivate the two
objections above, rather than simply a label for whatever might provide such an explanation?
These questions resemble salient questions about PMPs, helping to highlight the worries
about an account of know-how that relies on the latter.
I will offer further criticisms of PMPs in the following section, after reviewing some
characteristic features of knowledge-that.
4.3 Characteristic features of ordinary knowledge-that
In this section, I will argue that Intellectualist analyses of know-how imposes require-
ments that are too strong. My strategy will be to point to notable characteristics of the kind
of knowledge possessed in cases where we say 'S knows that p', showing that there is a kind
of know-how that lacks those features. Some of these features will seem more central to
knowledge-that than others, and it will likely occur to the reader that know-how might simply
be an atypical kind of knowledge-that. Such a view will be discussed thoroughly later.
Let us start with a paradigm case of the sort of knowledge that anti-Intellectualists have
had in mind: An individual S has, through trial and error but no formal instruction, come to
know how to ski. Her knowledge might lack any number of features that are prominent in
standard cases we discuss under the heading "knowledge-that". First, despite having normal
linguistic abilities and normal introspective access, S might be unable to state what she knows
with a self-report of the form 'I know that...' or by asserting the content of her knowledge.
Suppose someone claims to know how to swim and an interlocutor replies "Oh, what is it
that you know? Because I'd like to know how to swim, too." The average person would
probably simply be baffled, but even a brave Intellectualist could at best muster up something
that would not at all seem to amount to their knowledge of how to swim. Perhaps they
could offer something like "To swim, you use your arms and legs to push downward on the
water, propelling yourself upward to prevent yourself from sinking." Intuition is strong that
knowledge of this is not what knowledge how to swim consists in.
This looks like the worry discussed earlier about the sufficiency of Intellectualist analyses,
but the important point now is the contrast with other sorts of knowledge. Generally, a sincere,
reflective speaker who knows that p and has normal linguistic abilities will be disposed to
verbally acknowledge that p. Consider other kinds of knowledge-wh. If someone asserts that
they know who killed JFK and an interlocutor asks "Oh, what is it that you know?", it would
be bizarre if no answer of the form '... killed JFK' could be provided. There is an expectation
that the knower will be capable of putting her knowledge into sentential form, and in fact we
would ordinarily use an inability to do so as evidence that the individual did not in fact know
who killed JFK. Similarly for knowing where the president lives, knowing why the sky is
blue, and so on. But for much know-how, the opposite is true. Knowing how to ski, knowing
how to write good poetry, knowing how to wiggle one's ears, knowing how to speak French
- an inability to express such knowledge sententially is to be expected.
It might be noted that sometimes knowledge-that is only expressible using indexicals.
For instance, pointing to a color sample, "My car is that color" (Stanley Forthcoming). Or
I might know that the meeting starts now without being able to state anything of the form
'The meeting starts at ... o'clock'. It might then be objected that the above disanalogy be-
tween knowledge-that and know-how disappears when we allow that know-how might only
be expressible using indexicals. There are a couple of powerful reasons to reject this objec-
tion. First, appealing to indexicals does not actually eliminate the disanalogy. S&W highlight
claims of the form 'That is a way for me to swim' (2001: 426), asserting that such claims
are ways of expressing what one knows when one knows how to swim. But this is refuted by
the fact that S could know any such fact without having anything like the knowledge that she
actually possesses. Just by watching other swimmers in action, S can come to know that that
is a way for her to swim (or that she could swim like that), but such learning can take place
before S learns how to swim herself. This bring us to a second reason for rejecting the appeal
to indexicals. It is brought out by the following considerations.
Any instance x of swimming exemplifies indefinitely many ways of swimming. By ab-
stracting away from more of fewer features of x, one can get more or less specific ways of
swimming. For instance, we can suppose that x is an instance of moving one's right arm with
greater force than one's left arm, of doing the backstroke, of taking a breath every fifth arm
stroke, of reaching 29 inches past one's head with each arm stroke, of swimming at 2pm, of
swimming in Lake Winnipesaukee at 2pm on October 2, 2006, of moving S's arms and legs,
and so on. One way of swimming, w*, is to swim in a way that has all the features of x. But
w* is so specific that it is would be false for an observer to demonstrate w* and assert of it
that it was a way for them to swim (or a way that they could swim). Hence an observer could
not possibly express their knowledge how to swim by demonstrating w*.
Many combinations of features of x would amount to something that was not a way for
a given observer to swim. For given the great number of features of x, there are a great
number of combinations of those features that one could be demonstrating in asserting 'that
is a way for me to swim', and a great many of those combinations include properties that
could not be exemplified by a given observer. Other combinations are too general: Let w+ be
swimming by moving one's body appropriately. Knowing that w+ is a way for one to swim
does not suffice for knowing how to swim. So there are restrictions from two sides: Some
ways of swimming are too specific, and others too general. But to think that that is a way
for her to swim, S must grasp some particular proposition with particular truth-conditions.
This requires that S's thought determine that there be some ways of swimming that count
as swimming like that and other that do not. S's demonstrative must correspond to some
categorization in thought of various ways of swimming. The only way I can see that S could
conceptually single out a way of swimming that was neither too general nor too specific
would be in terms of particular features of instance x. S must think that way w with such-
and-such features is a way for her to swim. But this means that use of the demonstrative to
express a thought presupposes that S can identify particular features of x such that a way w
that possesses those features is a way for S to swim, and such that S's knowledge how to
swim consists in S's knowledge that such a way is a way for S to swim. So if S claims to
know how to swim and she is able to express the proposition knowledge of which constitutes
her know-how by saying 'that is a way for me to swim', she ought to be able to answer when
asked "What is a way for you to swim? What features of x are you pointing to?" Moreover,
her answer ought to make it plausible that her know-how really does consist in her knowledge
that the relevant way is a way for her to swim. I can think of no answer that would satisfy this
requirement, and Intellectualists have not made a persuasive case that there is one.
The objection to Intellectualism I have been defending is that possession of knowledge-
that, but not knowledge-how, can be shown absent when the subject is unable to state the
proposition that she supposedly knows. But there is a closely related point that is simply about
ineffability. No one else, including the philosophical theorist, is able to state a proposition
that plausibly constitutes someone's knowledge how to swim. The Intellectualist ought to tell
us what features of x are had by the way w that he demonstrates when he claims to explicate
S's know-how by saying "S knows that that is a way for her to swim". The theorists have no
excuse for not providing some account of these features, since we have shown above that it
ought to be possible for those features to be characterized. But it is far from obvious what
combination of features could go into a way w that would suffice in an Intellectualist's account
of know-how. Until this worry is addressed, indexicals do not offer a sufficient response to
the objection that know-how is not linguistically expressible - it has simply not been made
plausible that "S knows that that is a way for her to swim" really does attribute knowledge
sufficient for knowing how to swim.
The points about linguistic expression are connected to more general observations about
one's access to one's know-how. The latter observations are made most clearly by Charles
Wallis who, like Adams (Forthcoming) and Bzdak (2008), appeals to cognitive science to
evaluate Intellectualism. The first cases that Wallis highlights involve the know-how pos-
sessed by experts at various tasks. He argues that extensive investigation in cognitive science
and artificial intelligence has shown that experts can often not determine how they perform
the tasks that they are experts at. A standard example is the master chess player. The rules
and heuristics that correctly characterize the master's chess-playing can be as difficult for the
player to identify as for others who want to understand his techniques. That is part of why it
took years of research to create a computer program that could compete with the best chess
players in the world. The more general point here, independent of experts, is that it is ex-
tremely difficult to determine the procedures we ourselves use to perform various tasks. It is
not just that I cannot put into words my knowledge how to swim - that is simply a result of
the fact that I cannot put into conscious thought propositions that capture my knowledge. If I
could do the latter, I do not see why there would be any obstacle to the former.
The point about a lack of access to know-how is reinforced by cases of amnesia. Wallis,
Adams, and Bzdak all note that in severe cases of anterograde amnesia, patients can learn
how to perform a task or solve a puzzle without retaining any memory of having even en-
countered the task or puzzle let alone any memory that such-and-such is the correct strategy.
These patients have such severe impairments that any information that passes out of working
memory becomes unavailable. Famously, such patients have been told about the death of a
loved one, and after becoming extremely distraught, they promptly forget about it only to suf-
fer the same shock and sorrow the next time they are told. Such patients can eventually come
to know how to knit, say, or solve the Tower of Hanoi puzzle, but since they cannot remember
anything about these tasks, known propositions about them are certainly not available to any
higher cognitive operations (to "central executive functioning").
The data from cases of amnesia have provided much of the justification for the long-
standing view in psychology that procedural memory or knowledge is not a kind of declar-
ative memory or knowledge. Very roughly, the former is the sort of information-storage in-
volved in the acquisition and retention of skills (both perceptual-motor skills and more purely
cognitive skills like pattern-recognition and problem-solving - see Wallis and Adams) while
the latter is the sort of information storage involved in acquiring and retaining knowledge of
facts such as that Portland is rainy. Paradigm cases of procedural and declarative knowledge
map onto paradigm cases of know-how and ordinary knowledge-that, respectively, and in-
deed some well-known articles in the cognitive science literature have explicitly equated the
categories. Take, for instance, a piece from Science titled "Preserved learning and pattern-
analyzing skill in amnesia: Dissociation of knowing how and knowing that" (Cohen and
Squire 1980).
As Wallis and Adams both emphasize, neurological evidence from studies of memory
impairment strongly indicates that the exercise of procedural knowledge and of various sorts
of know-how involves brain areas dissociable from the hippocampus and medial or inferior
temporal lobe, the brain areas associated with declarative knowledge. But more abstract
characteristics have also been thought to separate procedural from declarative knowledge.
For instance, procedural knowledge may be acquired gradually and often cannot be acquired
all at once, while declarative can only be acquired all at once. Adams compares learning to
ride a bicycle with learning that Jim is 12 years old. Bill may have spent a month learning to
ride a bicycle, and he could not (by any normal means, at least) have gained that know-how
in an instant. In contrast, it makes no sense to imagine Bill spending a month learning that
Jim is 12 years old. Bill may have spent a month trying to find out how old Jim was, but he
was not learning the answer that whole time. He learned the answer in just a moment, when
he finally found Jim's birth certificate.
There are other ways of distinguishing procedural from declarative knowledge that may
be relevant to Intellectualism, for instance whether they are "rigid" or "plastic" in their appli-
cation (whether the knowledge can easily be transferred to new domains and applied to new
tasks), but I will not discuss them at length. The general lesson is that from a scientific point
of view it is a well-supported empirical hypothesis that there are two sorts of knowledge, one
more practical and skill-related and one more closely tied to ordinary knowledge of facts.
Wallis draws the moral that even if an agent has the latter sort of knowledge, it need not be
"causally operant in the manifestation of [knowledge-how]", contrary to Intellectualist claims
that one's knowledge of facts plays some crucial role in the exercise of know-how (see S&W
and Ginet (1975)).
I now want to turn back to the general question of cognitive access to know-how to make
another pertinent observation: Some kinds of know-how are unavailable to play a role in
reasoning. In usual cases where someone knows that a is red, he will, on learning that if a is
red then b is green, be able to infer that b is green. Or if he knows that a is colored red and
learns that b is colored red, he will be able to infer that a and b are the same color. Analogous
claims do not hold in typical cases of know-how, even if know-how does have propositional
content. Suppose that S knows how to turn a bicycle and that S's knowledge how to turn a
bicycle is propositional. The relevant proposition would be something like: One can turn a
bicycle in such-and-such way. Now suppose that one can turn a motorcycle in such-and-such
way, too. Whether S learns to ride a motorcycle in that way or is merely told that one can
turn a motorcycle in that way, this will be insufficient to allow S to infer that one can turn a
motorcycle and a bicycle in the same way. In fact, if S were attempting to infer something
about the similarities between bicycling and motorcycle riding, many of the beliefs about
the dynamics of bicycling that S appealed to would probably be false. One physicist writes,
"Almost everyone can ride a bicycle, yet apparently no one knows how they do it" (Jones
1970).16
Nothing hangs on the sort of proposition I have chosen - knowledge how to ride a bicycle
simply appears incapable of interacting with other knowledge in familiar patterns of reason-
ing. Similarly for other cases of know-how. I know how to wiggle my ears, and according to
the Intellectualist, this knowledge consists in knowledge that I can wiggle my ears by doing
such-and-such (or knowledge that such-and-such is a way for me to wiggle my ears). So we
would expect me to be able to use the following sort of premise to draw the following sort of
conclusion:
(71) (P) Doing such-and-such prevents atrophy of muscles that move the face and scalp.
(C) So, I can wiggle my ears in a way that prevents atrophy of muscles that move
the face and scalp.
But I can think of no replacement for 'such-and-such' that would make the inference one that I
was capable of carrying out while being an even remotely plausible candidate for constituting
my know-how. Even though I know how to wiggle my ears, I cannot employ in reasoning any
16Thanks to Richard Holton for the reference. Notice how different the quote would have sounded if it had
read "Almost everyone can ride a bicycle, yet apparently no one knows how to do it."
knowledge of the form "I can wiggle my ears by doing such-and-such" apart from, e.g., the
knowledge that I can wiggle my ears by moving some muscles somewhere near my ears. (In
response, the Intellectualist would probably try to appeal to indexicals - see the discussion
above for my rebuttal of this strategy.)
Many of the observations above have been leading us toward a rather bold objection to In-
tellectualism: Some know-how is possessed in the absence of belief in an appropriate propo-
sition, so the know-how cannot consist in ordinary knowledge of such a proposition. Acqui-
sition of know-how in cases of amnesia, inability to express one's knowledge, and inability
to employ one's knowledge in reasoning are all prima facie evidence that one's knowledge is
not knowledge of a proposition one believes. There is another reason to draw the same con-
clusion: People often believe propositions that falsely characterize the ways they do things.
On everything from bicycle-riding (see (Jones 1970)) to baseball-catching (see (Shaffer and
McBeath 2005)), we believe that we can perform the task in a certain way when in fact we
do not and cannot. Wallis reports that trained clinicians, for instance, believe that certain
judgment methods are the ways to make clinical judgments, and believe that those methods
are the very ones that they in fact employ. However, those beliefs turn out to be mostly false
- the clinicians know how make the clinical judgments, but they believe false propositions
about methods for making judgments, not the the true ones that would guide their behavior if
Intellectualism were true.
Wallis also notes that the literature on heuristics for problem-solving shows that we are
often quite wrong in our beliefs about how to solve various puzzles, even when we have
learned to solve those very problems ourselves. Likewise, we are often quite wrong in our
beliefs about how to arrive at reliable judgments on everyday matters. To take an example
Wallis does not discuss, when we judge someone's age based on the appearance of his or her
face, we rely on numerous visible features that the typical person would believe that one could
not or ought not rely on. For instance, one might naturally believe that one cannot correctly
do the following: Attribute greater age to someone who has a fatter face, thinner lips, and
more coloration of the skin. I, for one, had supposed that older faces were more gaunt and
pale rather than more fat and colored. But the features listed are some of the reliable cues
that people in fact rely on in exercising their knowledge of how to estimate age from visual
appearance (Bruce and Young 1998: ch. 3).
So in perfectly ordinary cases of know-how, false propositions fit everyday criteria for
what people believe about how to do things, while the Intellectualist's propositions do not
fit those criteria. The most straightforward conclusion to draw is that know-how does not
require belief. Ryle suggested as much in his pioneering work, but the evidence he offered
was somewhat dubious. In his (1949), he remarks that we cannot say that someone believes
how, but it is not obvious that our conclusion follows from this observation. The problem may
be purely grammatical, as S&W have suggested. If the problem is grammatical, though, it is
not as superficial as the inability of 'believes' to take embedded questions as complements
(Stanley and Williamson 2001). Consider the following, which is perfectly felicitous:
(72) A: John knows that Obama will win.
B: Yeah, he wouldn't believe that if it weren't true.
In constrast, the following dialogue sounds terrible.
(73) A: John knows how to ride a bicycle.
B: *Yeah, he wouldn't believe that if it weren't true.
Since the belief attribution in this dialogue is syntactically identical to the one in the previ-
ous dialogue but the two belief attributions differ in acceptability, Ryle's observation is not
explained by claiming that 'believes' cannot take a wh-complement.
Furthermore, as has somehow escaped notice in the literature thus far, 'believe' can be
complemented by an embedded question (though not by 'how to...') in some constructions:
(74) a. I could hardly believe how quickly the beer disappeared.
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b. I could hardly believe what Jane wore to the party.
c. *I could hardly believe how to swim.
The grammatical examples of this sort are clearly related to other question-embedding con-
structions, and are not to be explained away as loose ways of expressing something else.
They seem to fit the general pattern of analysis for knowledge-wh attributions: (74-a) is what
I might say to express that I could hardly believe that the beer disappeared as quickly as it
did, and (74-b) is what I might say to express that I could hardly believe that Jane wore the
outfit she did.
The anomalous status of (74-c) might seem of great interest to the anti-Intellectualist, but
that sentence is paralleled by the following cases involving infinitival embedded questions:
(75) a. *I could hardly believe when to exercise.
b. *John could hardly believe why to wear a life-preserver.
c. *She could hardly believe where to buy a house.
It remains a mystery to me why these would be ungrammatical while (75-b) and (75-c) are
not. In sum, although we have drawn the same conclusion as Ryle, the data he appealed to
were more complex than he thought, and sorting them out would require a significant detour
that I will not pursue here.
One final note about know-how and belief: The Intellectualist may insist that while our
conclusion is right about ordinary belief, there is another kind of belief such that people who
know how to do have that kind of belief in the right propositions about Oing. I am not
wholly opposed to the claim, but it is of little threat to anti-Intellectualists, since the points
above are about our everyday notion of belief.
Now that we have discussed belief, we should turn to another aspect of the traditional
conception of knowledge-that: justification. When someone claims to know how to swim, it
just does not make sense to ask about the grounds for her knowledge (1949: 28). Intuitively,
in questioning whether Diane knows how to swim, questions like "Does she have sufficient
justification?" do not seem applicable. Even if this is not totally obvious, the point can be
supported by an argument that appeals to the notion of learning to do something. Whether
Diane has acquired any justified beliefs about swimming is intuitively irrelevant to whether
she has learned to swim - so long as Diane has acquired sufficient skill at swimming, the
question is resolved. Now, we can validly infer from the fact that Diane has learned to swim
that Diane has learned how to swim. I, at least, cannot imagine a case in which the former
is true but the latter false. Next, we can observe that there appears to be no room to deny
that, since Diane has learned how to swim (and has not lost any knowledge since then), she
knows how to swim. It is hard to even understand the opposite claim, as it would force us
to sever the natural connection between learning and acquiring knowledge. So, since Diane's
learning to swim is independent of justificatory considerations, but entails the acquisition of
knowledge how to swim, the latter is also independent of justificatory considerations.
If know-how could be Gettiered, then the conclusion here would be wrong. S&W provide
a relevant case, but I doubt Ryle would be convinced: An aspiring pilot is training on a
flight simulator. Someone attempts to thwart his efforts by scrambling the code for the flight
simulation program, but by sheer coincidence the simulator behaves exactly as normal. The
trainee leaves the simulator with the ability to fly, but does he know how to fly? It seems
perfectly reasonable to me to say that he does, even setting aside the argument given above.
A casual perusal of the literature reveals quite a bit of agreement on this point.17 See, for
instance, (Poston Forthcoming) and examples and arguments in (Cath 2009b).
Another reason to doubt that know-how is a kind of knowledge-that is brought out by the
following line of thought. No one can know that p unless she is capable of judging that p, and
she is capable of that judgment only if she possesses relevant concepts. Perhaps it is unclear
what it is to possess a concept, but whatever it is, it provides a way to distinguish between
17I should note that different notions of justification deserve individual discussion that I cannot provide here.
For instance, Hawley (2003) claims that knowledge how to 4 requires warrant, but means that the nearby worlds
in which one Os must be ones in which the Oing is not accidental or lucky. It is not obvious how to map such a
view, or any view on which warrant is understood externalistically, onto the discussion here.
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the cognitive powers of various individuals. Some individuals are able to have occurrent
thoughts about telemarking, a type of skiing, and others cannot. But an individual who lacks
the concepts of telemark skiing and alpine skiing, possessing only the general concept of
skiing, may nevertheless know how to telemark. The point, just to be clear, is not about
knowledge attributions. It is a point about know-how itself. Knowing how to telemark ski
does not seem to require one to possess all of the concepts necessary to grasp the proposition
that, say, w is a way for x to telemark ski. On this basis, the anti-Intellectualist could claim
that know-how is, in a certain sense, non-conceptual.
The point here connects with my earlier observations about the thoughts one might ex-
press by saying "that is a way for me to ". Anyone who can telemark is in a position to
say "this is a way for me to do this", but that does not mean that anyone who can telemark
expresses a thought about telemarking by uttering that sentence. To do so, one must be aware
of the features that distinguish that form of skiing from other activities. If one does not know
basic facts such as that in "this" activity, one's heel is able to lift off of the ski, then one is
not thinking about telemarking as opposed to alpine skiing. And one might know how to
telemark ski without understanding that its distinguishing features include one's heel being
free. In fact, one might learn to telemark without realizing that one's heels were able to lift
off the ski - on mild slopes, one may keep one's heels on one's skis.
Another reason to doubt that the concept-requirement of knowledge-that applies to know-
how comes from our earlier observations about the difference between someone who knows
how to wiggle his ears and someone who does not. Suppose we grant that Bill knows that
that [pointing at me as I wiggle my ears] is a way for him to wiggle his ears. He still does
not know how to wiggle his ears, so what is the difference between us? The difference is
clearly not that I am thinking in the right way about the relevant way of wiggling while Bill
is not. In fact, I may not have any thoughts at all about any way of ear-wiggling - I just do
it in the way that other people mindlessly fidget by tapping their fingers. So why think that
I must have a concept of a way of ear-wiggling that is the concept of the way I wiggle my
ears? It seems unlikely that I do, given that I have no idea what means one takes to wiggle
one's ears. In absence of any good argument to the contrary, I think it reasonable to think that
some know-how is independent of concept-possession.
One final piece of evidence for the non-conceptual nature of some know-how, as well
as for the general claim that know-how does not require knowledge-that, comes from facts
about animals. Wallis notes that it is quite obvious that animals are not merely physically
able to perform various tasks, but know how to perform those tasks. A rat may know how to
negotiate a maze for instance, and certain crows know how to use tools for various purposes.
But it is doubtful that a crow genuinely has the propositional knowledge that, e.g. it can
fashion a hook out of a wire and use it to retrieve a bit of food out of a thin glass tube, even if
that is exactly what the crow does. Similarly, Alva Nod notes that dogs are not smart enough
to grasp many propositions, and more generally "whether or not they can grasp propositions
is an open question". Nevertheless it is clear that dogs often know how to do various things,
e.g. catch a Frisbee (Nod 2005: 289). I would add that it is unclear whether dogs have the
concepts of catching or of Frisbees, much less particular ways of catching frisbees. And it is
very doubtful that rats have the concept of a maze.
We do occasionally attribute knowledge to animals, but this does not reduce the force of
the present point. Even if we might sometimes say 'Alva's dog knows that he can catch a fris-
bee by clamping his jaws around it' it is quite unclear how literally we should take this. And
moreover, it is the contrast with know-how attributions that is important: We have no hesi-
tation at all in attributing know-how to even quite stupid animals, and there is no inclination
to take such attributions as less than fully literal. If know-how were just knowledge-that, we
would expect there to be no contrast in our intuitions about the appropriateness of knowledge-
that and know-how attributions. Thus we have another reason to think that know-how does
not consist in knowledge-that.
4.4 PMPs again
I have already argued that "practical modes of presentation" do not offer an adequate
way to defend Intellectualism. Now that I have highlighted a number of respects in which
know-how does not appear to be ordinary knowledge-that, I want to put forward some further
arguments against PMPs.
I think many of the features of know-how discussed above are features that are not pos-
sessed by knowledge of facts under familiar modes of presentation (e.g. de se knowledge
about oneself, indexical knowledge about the present time or place, or demonstrative knowl-
edge of things presented to one in sensory experiences). If this is true, then the prima facie
case that some know-how is not knowledge-that cannot be accommodated by arguing that
knowledge under a PMP is no more special than other knowledge under modes of presenta-
tion.
Consider first the question of justification. While we saw reason to think that some know-
how is independent of justificatory considerations, there is no reason to think that this is
explicable in terms of modes of presentation. The model for special modes of presentation,
first-personal knowledge about oneself, is obviously subject to Gettier-like problems. Sup-
pose (a) I believe in a first-personal way that either my credit report is bad or I am descended
from George Washington, (b) my credit report is bad, but I am not descended from George
Washington and (c) I am justified in believing the disjunction because I am justified in believ-
ing that I am descended from George Washington. Intuitively, I do not know the disjunction
that either my credit report is bad or I am descended from George Washington. There is
nothing special here about de se knowledge. A similar case could obviously be constructed
for the knowledge that the meeting starts this week, or for the knowledge that that is George
Bush.18
Similar points apply to other properties surveyed above. For instance, there is no reason
18Stanley (Forthcoming) claims that there is a distinctive mode of presentation associated with knowledge-
where, and that knowledge-where does not require justification, but I do not feel the force of the examples he
appeals to.
to doubt that first-personal knowledge about oneself or one's temporal or spatial location, or
demonstrative knowledge about objects around one, are linguistically accessible and express-
ible, generally available to central executive functioning, and requiring of concept-possession.
But rather than dwelling on these points to further criticize appealing to modes of presentation
to capture the special properties of know-how, I will focus on two other properties.
Recall the point above about the acquisition of procedural knowledge and of declara-
tive knowledge. The point applies to the intuitive categories of know-how and ordinary
knowledge-that: the kind of know-how at issue in typical cases is a sort of knowledge that
is acquired gradually, rather than all at once, while ordinary knowledge-that is acquired all
at once rather than gradually. Bill's learning that Jim was 12 years old did not take place
gradually over the course of a month, though his efforts to learn Jim's age may have ex-
tended throughout the month. But Bill's learning how to ride a bicycle was a gradual process
- no one knows how to ride a bicycle after having lacked this knowledge a second earlier.
In order to accommodate intuitions that know-how is a special kind of knowledge, S&W
have appealed to modes of presentation, so we should ask whether the observation about
knowledge-acquisition can be dealt with in this way.
In fact, the distinctive process of acquisition of know-how cannot be explained by analogy
with familiar modes of presentation. First-personal knowledge that, e.g., my credit report is
bad is knowledge that is special in various ways, and has dispositional implications that are
lacked by knowledge that that guy's credit report is bad (I will be disposed not to apply for a
home loan, for instance). But it is no different from ordinary knowledge-that when it comes
to gradual acquisition. It takes only an instant for me to add de se knowledge about my bad
credit to my body of information, even if efforts to acquire such knowledge extend over long
periods of time. Similarly, the knowledge that tax returns are due this week is knowledge
under a special mode of presentation, but that bring along no special temporal features of
its acquisition. This undermines the attempt to use PMPs to argue that know-how is not so
special, for PMPs would have to explain, by yet unknown means, something that no familiar
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modes of presentation need to explain.
There is a similar feature that ordinary modes of presentation have no need to explain, but
which marks know-how as special: the loss of know-how involves a process unlike the loss
of ordinary knowledge-that. Consider a surfer who not only knows that that is a way to hang
ten, but knows how to hang ten himself. As his coordination, balance, and muscle strength
deteriorate in old age, there comes a point when the surfer's know-how fades away. Pointing
to a hunched over, geriatric man with walker, one cannot say "That guy knows how to hang
ten", unless it is clear in the context that one simply means that he has the kind of knowledge
that is shared by anyone knowledgeable about surfing, e.g. knowledge that one hangs ten by
standing on the front of the surfboard. Similarly, someone who used to know how to play
Pierre Boulez's Second Sonata on piano may no longer, despite having the sharpest memory
in the world. She might be able to tell you just as much about playing the Second Sonata
as she always could, and give no indication of having forgotten any facts. As her skills and
abilities have faded, so has a kind of know-how that she used to possess.
The Intellectualist would attempt to explain these observations by claiming that what the
pianist and surfer have lost is simply knowledge of a ordinary fact under a PMP. But reason
to believe such a claim is undermined by comparing the phenomena above with features of
de se knowledge. Becoming old and arthritic has no effect on my first-personal knowledge
that my credit report is bad, nor on my indexical knowledge that that is a way to play the
Second Sonata. These are typical pieces of knowledge under special modes of presentation,
but they are easily retained by someone with a sufficiently sharp memory, regardless of their
coordination, balance, strength, and other bodily attributes.
Stanley and Williamson would likely try to respond by emphasizing that some ordinary
indexical knowledge is lost simply by the change in circumstances of an individual. If the
meeting starts now, and I know that, I cannot know tomorrow in the de se way that the meeting
starts now. It would then be argued then that know-how of the sort at issue above is similar.
But attend to the question of what has changed in the temporal case. The time and date have
changed, obviously. And in the case of someone who moves to New York and so no longer
knows in the de se way that this is Cambridge, what has changed is obviously the person's
location. He is no longer positioned appropriately to be able to pick out Cambridge by think-
ing about it as one thinks about the location one occupies. The problem with individuals who
lose knowledge under familiar modes of presentation is thus typically that they are no longer
able to think about the relevant place or time in the appropriate way.
Let us now contrast the loss of the pianist and surfer's know-how. Have those individuals
simply lost the ability to think about the relevant activities (or ways of performing them) in
the right way? This is hardly obvious, in contrast to the cases above. We can step back,
though, and ask what circumstantial changes the individuals have undergone. Their physical
and temporal locations are not what is relevant, since if their bodies had aged better, they
would still know how to hang ten or play the Second Sonata. And they might still be able
to point to an instance of hanging ten or playing the sonata and say, "that is a way to do
it." The only thing they seem to have lost is the ability to put themselves in a position to
say, demonstrating their own action, "this is a way to do it". But they have lost that because
they are unable to do the thing in question! Hence, it would seem that pursuing the analogy
between PMPs and familiar modes of presentation naturally leads one to place the real blame
for special losses of know-how on losses of ability. So the notion of a PMP plays no real role
- the data are accounted for more simply in the way suggested in section 4.1 and discussed
in section 5.4, by claiming that 'S knows how to 0' entails 'S can 0'.
We have now seen ample reason to think that PMPs, if explicable in any useful way,
cannot be explicated as just one member of the general family of modes of presentation.
Know-how is not just knowledge-that under a certain mode of presentation, at least not in any
sense that can be explained on the conception of modes of presentation that is philosophically
familiar.
5 Between Intellectualism and anti-Intellectualism
The considerations set out in the preceding sections provide good reason to think that
practical knowledge of how to swim is not just ordinary knowledge of a fact. In this section
I want to take a closer look at what conclusions really follow from the data above, showing
that we need make further distinctions among formulations of Intellectualism.
5.1 Strong Intellectualism and Weak Intellectualism
Let us begin by looking at our final regimentation of Intellectualism's defining thesis,
(25), and thinking about how the examples discussed above bear on that thesis.
We have considered several versions of 'F'. On S&W's view, F(p) iff p is a contextually
relevant proposition of the form: w is a way for x to 0. Alternatively, p is a proposition of
the form: x could 0 in way w, or: x can 0 in way w. I argued in section 4.1 that the latter is
most defensible, so I will focus on that in what follows. This gives us the following instance
of (25):
(76) 0] Vx (x knows how to swim +-* 3p (x knows p & p is a contextually relevant propo-
sition stating, for some w, that x can swim in way w)).
In section 4.3 we looked at examples of know-how that lack the characteristics of knowledge-
that, thus providing counterexamples to (76)- the left-hand side of the biconditional is sat-
isfied though the right-hand side is not. I now want to reconsider the import of those various
examples. In my discussions of the examples, I relied on a variety of assumptions about what
could be used as an identifying characteristic of knowledge-that. For instance: Knowledge-
that requires belief, justification and Gettierizability, linguistic accessibility, availability of
content for use in inference, and concept-possession. These are the sort of features typical of
the knowledge present in cases philosophers have discussed under the heading "knowledge-
that", so it natural to think that if they are not possessed by know-how, then know-how is not
knowledge-that.
But we should think harder about which of these features are really characteristic of the
kind of knowledge which Intellectualists want to use to explain know-how. Let us distinguish
a number of notions of knowledge-that according to how many features discussed in sections
4.3 are tied into the notion. We can let thinly propositional knowledge simply be knowledge
that has a proposition as a relatum, and let thickly propositional knowledge be knowledge of
a sort with a set of substantive requirements like those discussed above. We might actually
distinguish various thick notions of propositional knowledge. We might say that knowledge
is thickly propositional iff it is knowledge that requires belief and justification - this would
be a fairly minimal "thick" propositionality. A thicker notion might require some mixture of
other conditions such as being Gettierizable, being linguistically accessible, and having its
content available for use in reasoning. Various thick notions relate to each other in interesting
ways according to how the various properties discussed above relate to each other, but for
my purposes below the differences will not be very important. Let us simply note for the
moment that the paradigm cases of knowledge that epistemologists have focussed on seem
to represent a natural category of knowledge that is thick in some respects. For some subset
S of the properties above, this sort of thickly propositional knowledge possesses the features
in S. Call this theoretical knowledge and let us distinguish between a weak and a strong
Intellectualist thesis.
(WI) All know-how is knowledge that has a proposition as a relatum.
(SI) All know-how is theoretical knowledge.
Corresponding to this distinction, we could make (25) more explicit in two ways, one by
saying that x has knowledge with the proposition that p as a relatum, and one by saying that
x has theoretical knowledge of the proposition that p.
Now the key observation I want to make is simple: (WI) might be true without (SI) being
true. Perhaps the reader will find this claim obvious now that it has been brought to attention,
but I will provide three ways to help see the point.
First, to simply highlight the relevant portion of logical space: To my knowledge, no one
has ever given an argument from (WI) to (SI), and it is extremely difficult to see how such an
argument could go. For (WI) is a thesis about the relata of know-how, whereas (SI) is a thesis
about the relation itself: the properties in question are properties of the relation, not properties
of the proposition. How could one connect the two theses? Although it is very much up for
debate what properties know-how has, everyone agrees that it is a kind of knowledge. So the
relevant argument would have to show why strengthening this claim by adding that know-how
has a proposition as relatum would bring along all the properties of theoretical knowledge. I
simply do not see how this could go, or why the argument in this case would not carry over to
other propositional mental states. We take pretending that p to be a propositional mental state,
but this obviously does nothing to show that pretending that p requires belief that p or good
reason to believe that p. I take it that a non-theoretical sort of knowledge is conceivable, 19 so
why is such a conception incompatible with a proposition getting added to the picture?
Second, it is not hard to imagine a specific example of non-theoretical propositional
knowledge. Suppose that our interactions with physical objects and beliefs about the behav-
iors of those objects are guided by tacit knowledge of physical laws in the following sense.
The laws are represented implicitly in certain cognitive modules that are used to, e.g., allow
us to catch a baseball. We can tell approximately where projectiles will land, although not
many of us have any explicit knowledge about the laws that govern the motion of projectiles.
The relevant information is stored in sub-personal states that are independent of conceptual
resources and that are isolated from certain kinds of executive functioning - e.g. you cannot
state the laws that govern projectiles or apply your tacit knowledge of the laws in conscious
inference. In an everyday sense, you might have no reason to believe the relevant laws, and
19For two reasons: If it were not, the argument for Intellectualism would be much easier than it is - anti-
Intellectualism would not have seemed tempting in the first place; and second, we already countenance one form
of non-theoretical knowledge, albeit one quite different from know-how: Smith knows Jones.
you might even disbelieve them. Nevertheless, your cognitive system carries the information
that projectiles move in such-and-such way - it carries that propositional content. 20
I have a third, more abstract, reason to doubt that any argument for (SI) can be derived
from (WI). The thought relies on a general view about what the role of abstract objects is in
our characterizations of each other's mental states. How it is that we can capture some inter-
esting facts about people's minds by attributing to them certain relations to propositions? We
are physical objects with cognitive systems that help us negotiate our way through a phys-
ical world. How do some abstract entities, be they ordered n-tuples, functions from worlds
to truth-values, or Fregean senses, play any role in that story? A familiar answer is that the
semantic relations among propositions are mirrored by syntactic relations among the objects
that play causal roles in our behavior - symbols in a mental system of representation. The
brain operates on mental symbols in processes like inference, belief change, and linguistic
interpretation, and operates according to principles defined on the syntax of these symbols
(like the rules of inference of a formal system), but strings of these symbols can be mapped
to propositions which stand to one another in corresponding relations (e.g. entailment). Thus
propositions can be used to index the objects that really do the causal work in our lives.
This line of thought points to a more general perspective on relations to propositions. So
long as the members of a certain class of possible mental states can be put in some systematic
correspondence with propositions, the latter can be used to discuss the former. Take, for
instance, abilities. For any action of ping by an individual S, we could map S's ability to
onto the proposition that S s, and instead of saying that S is able to 0, we could say that
S "ables that he Os". If we had this linguistic convention, we might note that "abling" is an
attitude toward a proposition, but of course, by hypothesis, we would be talking about the
same thing we actually talk about with ability attributions. No strong Intellectualist view of
abilities results from the possibility of such a linguistic practice, and I see no reason to think
the case would be different with a practice of using propositions in our attributions of know-
20See Fodor (1968) for an account of abilities and know-how as a kind of tacit knowledge.
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how. Perhaps in speaking English we do use propositions to index states of know-how as well
as states of theoretical knowledge, but it hardly follows that know-how is a kind of theoretical
knowledge.
The point I am trying to make is inspired by discussions of numerical relations by Paul
Churchland (1979: 100-107), Robert Stalnaker (1987), and Robert Matthews (1994; 2002).
These authors ask us to compare the relations between people and propositions to the relations
between objects and units in claims like 'S has a mass of 150 pounds'. The semantic value of
'150 pounds' is a certain abstract object, so it looks like having mass is standing in a relation
to an abstract object. But how can abstract objects have any role to play in explanations of
physical bodies traveling through space, colliding with each other, etc.? Plausibly, natural
language exploits the fact that the class of mass properties has a certain structure, a structure
mirrored by a numerical scale, which allows us to use numerals to specify which property
out of the class an individual has. The answer I am suggesting to the question about the
role of propositions takes an analogous line: we use them, or sentential complements that
denote them, to help us pick out a mental state that an individual is in. What constraints does
this practice put on the natures of the states being indexed by propositions? If our use of
the 'knows how' locution is an instance of using propositions to index mental states, what
does that tell us about know-how? It appears to tell us nothing about the issues discussed in
Sections 1 and 4. It does not tell us whether know-how requires belief or justification, it does
not tell us whether know-how can play a role in inference, whether it requires possession of
certain concepts, and so on.
Now, despite all this, someone might try to produce an argument that (WI) entails (SI),
or at least entails an (SI)-like thesis in which the criteria for theoretical knowledge are re-
stricted to a few key items like belief and justification. "Look, suppose knowing how to 0
is knowing some proposition, say the proposition that p. So knowing how to 0 is knowing
that p. But surely if S knows that p, then S believes that p, and is justified in that belief. So
know-how requires belief and justification." But why accept the argument's premises? If it
seems plausible, that is only because we rarely (if it is even possible) attribute practical know-
how by using 'knows that', and our usual uses of the latter are uses to describe subjects who
have knowledge-that of the familiar sort that philosophers have traditionally focussed on. In
arguing from (WI) to (SI) one cannot simply assume that the traditional sort of knowledge-
that is the only sort there is. Indeed, one might just as well argue in the opposite direction.
Suppose that initially one has reason to think that practical know-how lacks various require-
ments that we normally associate with knowledge-that, including belief and justification. And
now suppose one is presented with some demonstration that all know-how is a relation to a
proposition. One now has two options. One can change one's view, concluding that it was a
mistake to think that practical know-how did not require belief and justification, since after
all, any knowledge with a proposition as a relatum requires belief and justification. Or one can
maintain one's view, concluding that belief and justification are inessential to propositional
knowledge after all, and are only features of the kind of propositional knowledge possessed
in the cases we normally focus on under the heading "knowledge-that" - theoretical knowl-
edge. The challenge for the objector is to provide an argument for the former response - to
my knowledge, none has ever been given. Independent of substantial further argument, (WI)
should not be taken to entail (SI).
While the distinction between the two theses has not so far been made in the literature,
doing so helps us avoid significant confusion. For instance, S&W expend effort defending
their view from the objection that know-how cannot be Gettierized. But that is only an ob-
jection to (SI). And the semantic precedents for a propositional analysis of 'knows how to 0'
that S&W appeal to in support of their view are really only precedents for treating know-how
in accord with (WI). S&W seem to have either conflated (WI) and (SI) or ignored the need
to provide an argument from the former to the latter. They do, however, make one relevant
comment:
If the special subclass of knowing-that which we call 'knowing-how' is too dis-
similar from other kinds of knowing-that, then one might suspect that we have
-
just recreated the traditional distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that,
but in other terms. So it must be that, on our analysis, knowing-how possesses the
characteristic features of other kinds of knowing-that. (Stanley and Williamson
2001: 434)
There is something right and something wrong with this claim. On one hand, S&W
are being too concessive: they explicitly aim to establish that know-how is propositional,
and it is irrelevant to whether they accomplish their aim that they make know-how a rather
distinctive kind of propositional knowledge. So what is wrong with their worry is that (WI)
really commits them to very little resemblance between know-how and other propositional
knowledge, and defense is unnecessary. On the other hand, S&W seem to be feeling the
force of the thought that what has been at stake in the debate is whether practical know-how
has the properties traditionally thought to be characteristic of propositional knowledge. So
what is right about their worry is that the thesis of Intellectualism has probably often been
intended to be something stronger than (WI), namely (SI), and if their view leaves know-how
very dissimilar from knowledge-that as standardly conceived, then they have indeed failed to
establish that conclusion.
Some of their critics have made the same error of failing to distinguish two theses that
the Intellectualist could have in mind. Wallis is an obvious example - at numerous points
he writes as if he is arguing against the thesis that know-how is propositional, but he at no
point offers an argument that know-how does not have a proposition as a relatum. He only
argues that the mental state itself lacks various properties possessed by ordinary cases of
'S knows that p'. Another example is Schiffer (2002), who offers criticisms that apply to
(SI), but offers no argument that the falsity of (SI) entails the falsity of (WI). These authors
are not alone - perusal of the literature shows a general lack of arguments for connecting
know-how's propositionality to its possession of various features of theoretical knowledge.
The upshot of the distinction for our observations in section 4.3 is clear. The examples
there show that (SI) is false, but do not thereby show that (WI) is false. All know-how may
have propositional content despite practical know-how lacking the properties of theoretical
knowledge.
5.2 Practical knowledge in English
Recall now our conclusions about the argument for Intellectualism in section 2. The
argument set out to establish the propositionality of know-how by showing that it followed
from a general theory of the syntax and semantics of knowledge-wh. Our central worry was
that the argument presupposed that there was no good reason from outside contemporary
syntactic theory to think that know-how was special. We have gone on to show that some
know-how is special, but we have also just seen that the respects in which it is special do not
show that it does not have propositional content. That means that we have not found anything
inconsistent with treating all know-how attributions semantically as follows: We take 'how
to 0' to denote a set of propositions and take 'knows' to have its usual role of relating an
individual to that set iff she stands in a relation of knowledge to a proposition in that set.
But then does 'know' not semantically express a special kind of propositional knowledge
in its use in know-how attributions, as opposed to its uses in other attributions of knowledge-
wh? Note that nothing we have said so far addresses this question. We have said that some
know-how is a special kind of knowledge, and we have said that some knowledge with propo-
sitional content is independent of belief, justification, and so on. But we could take either of
two positions now: We could hold that the special status of practical know-how is reflected in
a linguistic ambiguity in propositional uses of 'knows', or we could hold that there is no such
ambiguity. I think both positions are defensible, though I will defend an ambiguity. Before
doing so, it is worth explaining the other view for a moment.
A non-ambiguity view could be spelled out in two ways. First, one could hold that
'knows' has a thin semantics that does not entail belief, justification, and so on, though it is
part of the nature of theoretical knowledge that entails these things. The explanation for why
'S knows that p' seems to entail that S believes p and is justified in believing p would be that
such sentences are conventionally used when the subject possesses theoretical knowledge.
Second, one could hold that 'knows' has a thick semantics that entails belief, justification,
and so on, though there is a convention allowing 'S knows how to 0' to be used when a sub-
ject has non-theoretical knowledge. The conventions appealed to in these accounts would
have to be motivated, but I suspect this could be done with some ingenuity. However, I think
the preponderance of evidence points toward an ambiguity in 'knows', so this is the strategy
I will now pursue.21
My view is that on one interpretation of 'S knows how to 0', 'knows' expresses a kind of
non-theoretical knowledge with the characteristics discussed in section 4.3. On other uses of
'knows' in which it is complemented by a that-clause or an embedded question, it expresses
theoretical knowledge. In section 3.5 we discussed the conjunction-reduction test for am-
biguity, and I now want to return to that issue. We concluded that when the test results in
an anomalous sentence, we have good evidence for an ambiguity, but when the test results
in an acceptable sentence, we have somewhat shaky evidence against an ambiguity. As we
discussed, S&W use the acceptability of sentences like (33) to argue against an ambiguity
in 'knows'. But when we look at the data more closely, we find that the test suggests the
opposite.
Recall that in section 3.9 we noted that 'S learned to 0' does not mean the same as 'S
learned how to 0', though on at least one interpretation of the latter, it is entailed by the former.
I suggested that 'learned to' provides a parallel in English for special know-how locutions in
other languages such as French, in which know-how is attributed with a knowledge-verb,
'savoir', complemented by an infinitive rather than an embedded question. I now want to use
these infinitive-complemented verbs to support an ambiguity in 'S knows how to 0'. Consider
the following:
(77) a. *John learned that swimming is fun and to do it.
2 1For an example of another philosopher who explicitly defends an ambiguity in 'knows' see Rosefeldt
(2004).
b. ?Mary learned about knitting and to knit.
c. *Bill learned why he should exercise and to play tennis.
This confirms that there are multiple interpretations of 'learns'. Now, we should expect a
distinction among kinds of knowing if there is a distinction among kinds of learning. My
view accommodates this point. Since there is no reading of 'John knows to swim' (with no
complementizer) corresponding to the non-deontic interpretation of 'John learned to swim',
it seems that in English, the semantic slack is taken up by 'knows how to'.
And while conjunction-reduction does not directly reveal a special interpretation of 'knows
how to 0', there is another way in which it provides indirect support. If there are two sorts of
uses of 'knows' which are translated by semantically distinct locutions, then 'knows' itself
has semantically distinct interpretations. For since translation is meaning-preserving, two
uses of 'knows' cannot be translated by semantically distinct locution while being semanti-
cally equivalent to each other. And the conjunction-reduction test points to an ambiguity in
the French verb 'savoir' that translates 'knows'.
(78) a. *Elle sait nager et que Damien nages.
She knows to-swim and that Damien swims.
She knows how to swim and that Damien swims.
b. *Elle sait que Damien nages et nager.
She knows that Damien swims and to-swim.
She knows how to swim and that Damien swims.
Thus French provides evidence that the English 'knows how to' conceals two interpretations.
This conclusion is reinforced even further by the observation in section 3.9 that in some
languages like Russian, there is a verb used only to attribute know-how, while in no languages
are there special verbs used only to attribute, e.g., knowledge-when. If Russian sometimes
translates 'knows' with one verb and sometimes with another depending on whether know-
how is being attributed, this indicates that 'knows' in English is actually expressing two
different things.
Jason Stanley has claimed to explain the data from French, Russian, and similar languages
while maintaining Intellectualism. He does not note the results of the conjunction-reduction
test in those languages, so I cannot discuss his views on that issue, but he does offer some
claims about how to interpret the relevant constructions. 'Savoir faire', he says, is not seman-
tically distinct from 'savoir comment faire' - 'comment' (which translates 'how') is always
syntactically present, but it is only optionally pronounced. Furthermore, in 'John sait nager',
there is also a silent "free manner variable" (Stanley Forthcoming). To explain the difference
in usage between 'savoir faire' and 'savoir comment faire', Stanley claims that there is a con-
vention of attributing knowledge under a PMP when the complementizer is unpronounced,
and of attributing knowledge under an ordinary mode of presentation when the complemen-
tizer is pronounced. I have already explained in sections 4.2 and 4.3 why PMPs do not
provide an adequate way of accommodating the intuitions about English truth-conditions that
seem to favor anti-Intellectualism, and the same points apply to intuitions about sentences of
other languages. I will not rehearse those points, but it is worth drawing attention to another
worrisome aspect of Stanley's approach. In discussing the fact that Russian and some other
languages have special verbs for know-how, not just special constructions involving the usual
knowledge-that verb, he writes:
One might wonder why there are languages in which "know how + infinitive"
is translated with a different word than the propositional knowledge verb, if it is
analyzed in terms of it. It does not seem, for example, that there are languages
in which "know who + infinitive" is translated with a different verb. But an
alternative explanation is ready to hand. "How" is the only question word that
is optionally pronounced in embedded question constructions across languages.
The fact that some languages employ a different verb to translate "know how +
infinitive" may simply be a reflection of this purely accidental grammatical fact
about "how". (Stanley Forthcoming)
There are two problems here. First, Stanley gives no explanation of why the option to
have a silent complementizer would result in use of a completely different lexical item for
the verb that takes the complement in question. I can think of no reason that it would to
offer on his behalf. And in English, the 'that' complementizer is optionally pronounced (e.g.
in 'John knows it's raining'), but there is no special verb we use in place of 'knows that'.
Second, and more importantly, there is no explanation for why 'how' and its counterparts in
other languages would be the only wh-complementizers in any language that were optionally
pronounced. That would be a surprising and odd fact, and there is no motivation for the claim
independent of Intellectualism. The only apparent reason Stanley thinks that 'savoir faire'
has a silent complementizer and silent "free manner variable" is that he thinks it expresses or-
dinary knowledge-that. But why think that? There is at least prima facie reason not to, since
'savoir faire' is - again, at least prima facie - evidence that some know-how is linguistically
singled out as special. Stanley needs to motivate his claims about Russian, French, and so
on, and he cannot do so by running an argument parallel to the one in section 3.3. That argu-
ment essentially assumes that there are no reasons outside of standard syntactic and semantic
theories of English for hypothesizing a special interpretation of 'S knows how to ', and the
parallel claim is prima facie false of the other languages in question. Nor can Stanley's view
of such languages simply be motivated by a desire to parallel attributions of know-how in
English, since this would be question-begging: the cross-linguistic data is offered by the anti-
Intellectualist as evidence that English and the other languages are similar, and that practical
know-how is represented in both. I conclude that the data I have cited in favor of an ambiguity
in English stand - Stanley's alternative account of the data is unsatisfactory.
I now want to offer two other reasons to think that the special status of some know-how is
reflected by an ambiguity in English. Here is a loose heuristic for detecting an ambiguity in a
sentence-form s: If a speaker asserts s and an interlocutor responds with reason to accept not-
s, then if the speaker can felicitously retort "That's not what I meant", then s is ambiguous.
This test works for both structural ambiguity and lexical ambiguity.
(79) A: John Stamos has a lot of fans.
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B: No, in fact no one likes him or anything he's ever done.
A: That's not what I meant. [... Stamos has a problem with hoarding household
appliances.]
(80) A: Visiting relatives can be difficult.
B: I don't think so - I've always found my relatives to be quite congenial when
they are visiting.
A: That's not what I meant. [... They're difficult to visit if they're far away, for
instance.]




John doesn't know how to swim.
Sure he does! John, come over here and explain how to swim.
That's not what I meant. [... John never learned to swim, he just learned a little
about swimming.]
Of course, one can say 'That's not what I meant' when one intended to say something other
than what one did say, when one was speaking metaphorically, or when one's main intent
was to convey an implicature of the asserted sentence. But if there is no good reason to think
something like that is going on in examples like the ones above, I think the test provides at
least some evidence for ambiguities.
A related test is the following. If a speaker can felicitously assert a sentence of the form
'In one sense, s, but in another sense, not-s', then s is ambiguous. (Or in place of 'not-s', one
might say 'that's not the case', or 'that's not true'.)
(82) a. In one sense, John has a lot of fans, but in another sense, he doesn't have a lot
of fans.
b. In one sense, a boy kissed every girl, but in another sense, that's not true.
c. #In one sense, John owns a lot of household appliances, but in another sense,
that's not the case.
The same qualifications apply here, but the test prima facie suggests that know-how locu-
tions are ambiguous. Suppose Bill is extremely weak and uncoordinated, and so has never
learned to swim. But he is interested in swimming, and has read books about swimming
technique. He could easily explain how to swim, and has given helpful instruction to others.
The following is a perfectly apt characterization of his situation.
(83) In one sense, Bill knows how to swim, but in another sense, he doesn't know how to
swim.
I have now defended both the claim that there is a special, non-theoretical kind of know-how,
and the claim that the distinction between this practical know-how and ordinary knowledge
of facts is embodied in a linguistic ambiguity in 'knows'. I have also shown how my view
is compatible with the claim that all know-how has propositional content, so that it can be
fairly characterized as both a kind of Intellectualism (preserving (WI)), and as a kind of
anti-Intellectualism (rejecting (SI)). In the next section I want to further explain what the
propositional content of know-how might be.
5.3 The content of practical knowledge
The Intellectualist's observation that know-how locutions resemble other knowledge-wh
attributions does not show that (SI) is true, but it does illustrate that the most straightforward
semantic analysis of 'S knows how to 4' would treat it as true iff 'knows' related S to a
proposition of a certain sort. I propose to accept this straightforward analysis, since doing
so produces no conflict with the evidence about know-how surveyed above. What I want to
do now is to look more closely at what the propositions are that are the contents of know-
how. The central question, touched on in sections 3.1 and 4.1, is how we should interpret the
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modality contributed by the infinitival construction in 'how to 0'.
A widely accepted framework for the semantic analysis of modality is set out in influ-
ential work by Angelika Kratzer, especially her (1981) and (1991). The central idea is to
treat all modal expressions as quantifiers over restricted sets of worlds. Modal expressions
differ on three axes - their (quantificational) force, modal base, and ordering source. 'Can'
and 'must' illustrate a difference in force. The former is used to say that in some accessible
worlds, something obtains, while the latter is used to say that in all accessible worlds, some-
thing obtains. The notion of a modal base does the same work as the logician's accessibility
relations. Different uses of modal expressions involve different accessibility relations, i.e. the
expressions quantify over different sets of worlds, i.e. they have different modal bases. This
is illustrated by (84), taken from Kratzer (1991: 646):
(84) a. Hydrangeas can grow here.
b. Hydrangeas might be growing here.
(84-a) would be used to describe a place whose soil and climate could sustain the growth
of Hydrangeas, whether or not they have ever grown there. (84-b) would never be used to
describe a place known to be Hydrangea-free, even if the soil and climate are adequate. The
modal in (84-b) quantifies over the set of worlds compatible with what is known (by some
contextually relevant person or group, perhaps), while the modal in (84-a) quantifies over
the set of worlds in which the relevant location matches the actual world in features like
soil quality and climate. Kratzer captures this difference by saying that 'can' in (84-a) has
a circumstantial modal base (more on these below), while 'might' in (84-b) has a epistemic
modal base.
Ordering sources are sets of propositions that provide an ordering of the worlds in the
modal base (the accessible worlds) according to how close they come to satisfying certain
ideals or goals. A typical example would be provided by 'You should go to business school',
asserted in a context in which the salient goal is to become a wealthy business executive.
Different worlds in the modal base do better or worse in satisfying that goal, and can be
ordered accordingly. If you go to business school in all of the worlds that come closest to
satisfying your goal of becoming a wealthy business executive, then the assertion is true.
Personal goals are only one sort of ordering source. Others include bodies of law, codes of
morality, and norms of rationality.
Some uses of modal expressions have an empty ordering source, for example (85) as used
in a context in which John's strength is being discussed.
(85) John can curl this dumbbell.
The sentence means that in some worlds matching ours in relevant circumstantial facts (such
as the force of gravity, the mass of the dumbbell, and the condition of John's muscles), John
curls the dumbbell. Goals of John's and other sorts of norms are unimportant here, and may
vary throughout the modal base, so that (85) might be true even if in fact John hates curling
dumbbells, and so does not do so in any nearby world. Note that on its most salient use,
the sentence seems equivalent to 'John is able to curl this dumbbell'. Indeed, Kratzer treats
ability-locutions as just another sort of modal, discussing examples such as (86) (1981: 290).
(86) Nobody is able to run from Andechs to Aufhausen in ten minutes.
The worlds relevant to the truth of (86) are those that match the actual world in facts such as
those concerning human physiology, the composition of the earth's surface between Andechs
and Aufhausen, and the distance between the two cities - 'able' is a modal with a circum-
stantial modal base. Kratzer observes that not only 'able', but "any modality expressed by the
suffixes -ible or -able will likewise have a circumstantial modal base" (1991: 647). This is
clear in sentences like 'Pears are edible' and 'This violin is unplayable', which clearly do not
concern what is epistemically, metaphysically, or nomologically possible. They concern what
is compatible with, among other things, human constitution and the constitution of pears or
of the violin.
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It is well worth noting that "The kind of facts we take into account for circumstantial
modality are a rather slippery matter" (Kratzer 1981: 302), determined in a complex way by
the context in which a modal expression is used. Kratzer provides a helpful illustration in
discussing (87) (1981: 304).
(87) Ich kann nicht Posaune spielen.
I can not trombone play.
She writes:
I may mean that I don't know how to play the trombone. I am sure that there
is something in a person's mind which becomes different when he or she starts
learning how to play the trombone. A programme is filled in. And it is in view
of this programme that it may be possible that I play the trombone.
On the other hand, she observes, the sentence may be used in a slightly different way. If
I know how to play the trombone but have asthma, then I might use (87) to say "I am not
able to play the trombone." Further, external circumstances might interfere: "Imagine I am
travelling by sea. The ship sinks and so does my trombone. I manage to get to a lonely island
and sadly mumble ['Ich kann nicht Posaune spielen']". Here, "I could play trombone in view
of my head and my lungs, but the trombone is out of reach."
Some modal expressions, then, are quite flexible, allowing in different contexts of use for
different circumstantial facts to constrain the modal base. For a clear illustration in English,
consider an example of Paul Snowdon's (2003). Suppose that I have a safe in my home,
but I am thousands of miles away. Snowdon claims that I am unable to open the safe. That
seems right in a way, but when my friends call to ask "Are you able to open the safe at your
house?", or more naturally, "Can you open the safe at your house?", I could reply in either
of two ways: "Yes, of course, why would I own a safe that I wasn't able to open?" or "No,
I'm thousands of miles away". For the first response, imagine that my friends just want to
know whether I have forgotten the combination, say, or whether the door of the safe has been
welded shut. For the second case, suppose my friends have left something in my safe and
want me to retrieve it. Context affects whether or not 'I am able to open my safe' is true. A
similar point applies to another of Snowdon's examples. A chef may lack the flour to bake
his trademark cake. Whether the lack of flour deprives him of his ability to bake such a cake
depends on how our context constrains the modal base.
So on some uses of 'able' and 'can' (or similar verbs in other languages), the shipwrecked
musician is still able to play (can play) trombone, the traveler is still able to open (can open)
his safe, and the chef is still able to bake (can bake) his trademark cake. What seems to be
happening interpretively in these cases is that certain factors "external" to the individual are
being screened off from consideration. This phenomenon is in fact characteristic of some
modal expressions, as Kratzer illustrates with examples from German. Imstande sein, usually
translated as able, only concerns "strength of our body, character, or intellect" (1981: 304).
One would never use it to say that one was unable to play trombone due to one's trombone
being at the bottom of the ocean. Citing unpublished work by Ferenc Kiefer, Kratzer also
reports that in Old High German, kinnen expressed only "intellectual capacities", being later
extended to encompass physical capacities.
So while ability-locutions across languages are context-sensitive expressions, some have
the special function of restricting the modal base to circumstantial facts internal to an indi-
vidual. 22 In English, this function is served by general-purpose modals like 'able' and 'can'.
On some uses of the latter, the circumstances defining the modal base are internal facts - as
in Kratzer's examples, facts about an individual's body, character, or intellect.
The distinction between internally and externally oriented modals, or between internal
and external circumstances, has a close relative in the distinction between the 'can' of abil-
ity and the 'can' of opportunity (or between ability-able and opportunity-able). The latter
distinctions are found in the linguistics literature, e.g. in Hackl (1998), who analyzes ability-
locutions within Kratzer's framework, but they are due to early discussions by J.L. Austin
22Kratzer tells us that there are also modals that only concern external circumstances, e.g. the circumstantial




We are tempted to say that 'He can' sometimes means just that he has the ability,
with nothing said about opportunity, sometimes just that he has the chance, with
nothing said about ability, sometimes however, that he really actually fully can
here and now, having both ability and opportunity. (Austin 1956: 230)
But note that Austin's comments must be taken with 'ability' interpreted in an internal
way. For sometimes 'is able to' conveys that an individual has both what it takes internally
and has a certain opportunity, as in the reading on which the shipwrecked trombonist is not
able to play trombone. When Austin and Hackl use the term 'ability', they mean to draw our
attention to the sense in which a shipwrecked trombonist has not lost her ability.
5.4 Practical knowledge and abilities
Now I want to apply the above observations about modality to help us understand 'S
knows how to 0'. My suggestion is that in the uses of the sentence to attribute practical
knowledge, the infinitive contributes a circumstantial possibility modal whose base consists
of facts internal to the subject, as Kratzer suggests about the German imstande sein.
What counts as internal and what as external to an individual? Even if we do not offer
philosophical analyses of these notions, they are intuitive enough. If they are fuzzy on the
edges and contextually shifty, that is only the more appropriate to the phenomena we are
discussing. Consider a spectrum of cases in which there is no clear boundary between being
able and unable: Take an individual, Nina, and ask in which of the following cases she might
be able to play trumpet, or might know how to play trumpet. Case (a): The trumpet is in the
other room. Case (b): There is no trumpet anywhere nearby. Case (c): There are no trumpets
in existence (all have been destroyed), and no one who can build one. Case (d): Nina has a
23See also Pifi6n (2003: 390), who, like Kratzer, finds expressions in languages other than English that
distinguish among different uses of 'able' and 'can': "In Spanish, for example, if poder 'be able to' appears
in the preterite tense (pretirito), it corresponds to opportunity able, and if it appears in the imperfect tense
(imperfecto), it corresponds to ability able."
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hang-nail making it too painful to play trumpet. Case (e): Nina has a cast covering her entire
right hand. Case (f): Nina has lost both her hands in an accident. Case (g): Nina has had a
severe stroke, disrupting all of her bodily movements and coordination. Case (h): Nina is a
brain in a vat.
In different contexts, different cases may seem to be possible cases in which Nina can (or
is able to) play trumpet. My intuitions have it that Nina's ability extends at most through case
(e), but a modal more dedicated to internal factors than the English 'able' or 'can' could be
expected to be more generous. I think the covert modality of the infinitive in 'S knows how to
0' plays just this function. So we might state the propositional content of S's non-theoretical
knowledge how to swim in something like the following way: S has the internal ability to
swim. 24
Initial support for this hypothesis comes from its convergence with philosophical work
and commonsense intuitions that are independent of the linguistic considerations canvassed
above. From Ryle onward, many philosophers have found it a natural view, if not obvious,
that know-how at least entails ability. And in discussing my work with non-philosophers,
I have found it common for them to tacitly, or even explicitly, assume that if one knows
how to do something, then one has the ability to do it. Furthermore, Katherine Hawley has,
independent of the linguistic data, proposed that a criterion for possession of knowledge how
to 0 is that the subject successfully 0 in certain nearby possible worlds. "To say that Sarah
knows how to drive is to attribute success to Sarah under some but not all counterfactual
circumstances" (2003: 20).25 If my view is correct, we have an explanation of why such
views have come naturally - know-how does entail an ability of a certain sort.
Another benefit of my view, previewed in section 4.1, is that it provides a simple way
to explain why some knowledge about Oing does not suffice for know-how. Recall Stanley
and Williamson's example: S knows that that [demonstrating a passing bicycle-rider's way
24For a quite different attempt to spell out an internal notion of ability, see (Lihoreau 2008).
25In a somewhat similar vein, see Charles Wallis on the felicity of know-how attributions and the relative
closeness of various possible worlds.
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of riding] is a way for her to ride a bicycle, but she does not know how to ride a bicycle.
S&W deal with such examples by invoking practical modes of presentation, already criticized
above. Another way to deal with them would be to claim that 'knows' in 'S knows how to 0'
expresses a kind of ability. I avoid the need for either such move and have no need to invoke
any mysterious machinery. Know-how is simply a thinly propositional form of knowledge,
not an ability, but it has a content that entails that the subject possesses the relevant ability. If
S knows how to ride a bicycle, she must have the ability to do so. That is why knowing that
that is a way to ride a bicycle does not suffice for know-how. Similarly, I may know that that
is a way in which I could wiggle my ears (if I had the requisite muscle control, e.g.), but I
do not know how to wiggle my ears because I do not know that that is a way in which I can,
in the ability sense, wiggle them. I do not know that because it is false - I am not able to
wiggle my ears in any way at all.
A third virtue of my view is that it is not threatened by standard counterexamples to the
identification of know-how with ability. Readers familiar with the literature have no doubt
been thinking about cases like the following:
A ski instructor may know how to perform a certain complex stunt, without being
able to perform it herself. Similarly, a master pianist who loses both of her arms
in a tragic car accident still knows how to play the piano. But she has lost her
ability to do so. It follows that Ryle's own positive account of knowledge-how is
demonstrably false. (2001: 416)
The first thing to note is that the most these examples show is that there is one kind of
know-how that can be possessed without the corresponding ability. But that is already a com-
ponent of the view defended above, and has been evident since our preliminary discussions in
section 2.1. It is no threat whatsoever to the view that there is also an interpretation of 'Nina
knows how to play piano' on which it entails that Nina is able (on an internally-oriented use
of 'able') to play piano.
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Examples like those above would be more worrisome if it could be shown that the sort of
know-how present in those cases is the very sort that anti-Intellectualists want to highlight.
However, that does not seem to be true. Suppose that after the pianist's accident, with her
hands completely gone, I introduce you to her, saying "She knows how to play the piano really
well!" This sort of remark would in ordinary contexts be used to attribute practical know-how.
And note that in the context described, you would interpret my remark as some kind of cruel
joke, not a perfectly sensible report of her expertise. Or suppose we are in a retirement home,
chatting with a 100-year old man who is too weak to push his own wheelchair. The remark
"He knows how to ski" would be quite infelicitous. Similarly if we are chatting with a war
veteran who has lost both his legs.
The second thing to note about the putative counterexamples is that they ignore the fact
that the sort of ability entailed by know-how is not what was discussed earlier as "opportunity-
ability". It is an internal ability, what is attributed by a modal that screens off from consid-
eration circumstantial facts outside a subject. That is why there is no sense in which losing
one's trumpet results in one's losing one's trumpet-playing know-how. As noted above, the
circumstances relevant to uses of a modal expression are a context-sensitive matter. Modals
focussing on internal facts are no exception, so we should expect the internal facts relevant
to know-how to be somewhat shifty. To the extent that in a certain context one thinks of a
pianist's hands merely as tools that she uses to exercise her ability and as objects that can be
removed and replaced without alteration of the subject herself, an attribution of know-how
will seem more felicitous. S&W's piano-player is just a marginal variant of the following
sort of case: Nina was born without hands, but thanks to the wonders of modem medicine
and technology, she has been supplied with mechanical hands that plug into sockets on the
ends of her wrists. Using these artificial hands, Nina has become quite proficient at piano-
playing. Unfortunately, Nina's hands have recently been lost. Now in a sense, Nina can still
play piano, and this is why we can still say that Nina knows how to play piano.
The idea just defended converges with suggestions of Alva No6, who takes a similar
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approach to defend the claim that know-how entails ability. He maintains that S&W's ski
instructor and pianist both retain their abilities, but are prevented from exercising them due
to "the failure of a necessary enabling condition to be satisfied" (2005: 283). To warm us
up, we are offered the example of a pianist who just does not have access to a piano. Such a
pianist has not lost her ability, Noi says, since if only a certain enabling condition obtained,
i.e. a nearby piano was available, she could play just fine. Losing one's arms is just a more
severe analogue of losing one's piano. My view clarifies the notion of an enabling condition
by means of the general theory of circumstantial modals. What is behind Nod's idea is the
distinction between internal and external circumstances, a distinction that is part of a general
and widely-accepted framework in linguistic semantics. His defense of a close connection
between abilities and know-how is thus corroborated.
My account of know-how is now complete. I have set out the strongest case for Intellec-
tualism and shown that it is lacking. By investigating a variety of cases of know-how and
surveying cross-linguistic data, I have defended the commonsense and philosophically tradi-
tional view that know-how is not simply ordinary knowledge of facts. It is rather a form of
knowledge that, while possessing propositional content, need not be justified or warranted,
generally available to conscious executive functioning, or possessed of various other features
characteristic of the traditional cases of knowledge-that. It is more akin to the tacit knowl-
edge of physics with which baseball players unconsciously compute the trajectories of fly
balls - knowledge that is not the kind the folk attribute when they say 'S knows that p', but
that nonetheless is an information-carrying state. Thus Weak Intellectualism is true, though
Strong Intellectualism is false. In the final section of this thesis, I will take an in-depth look at
one important application of anti-Intellectualism. I will show that, contrary to what might ini-
tially be thought, Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument against physicalism can be blocked
so long as (SI) is false.
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6 Physicalism and practical knowledge
A central application of anti-Intellectualism has been in providing a response to Frank
Jackson's Knowledge Argument against physicalism. I will set out a version of Jackson's
argument here, using its main features to remind the reader of the "ability response" pressed
by authors including Nemirow (1980) and Lewis (1990) and to evaluate the importance of
know-how for that response. I take the basic structure of the argument to be the following:26
1. When she is still in the room, Mary knows all the fundamental physical facts.27
2. If Mary knows all the fundamental physical facts, then Mary is in a position to know
all the facts entailed by the fundamental physical facts.
3. If Mary acquires knowledge when she leaves her room, she acquires knowledge of a
fact.
4. When Mary leaves the room, she acquires knowledge that she had not been in a position
to acquire while in the room.
5. So when Mary leaves the room, she acquires knowledge of a fact that she had not been
in a position to acquire while in the room. [From (3) and (4)]
6. So Mary acquires knowledge of a fact that is not entailed by the fundamental physical
facts. [From (5), (1) and (2)]
7. So there is a fact that is not entailed by the fundamental physical facts. [From (6)].
According to the view of Lewis and Nemirow, it is true that Mary gains some knowledge
when she leaves her black and white room, but it is false that she gains knowledge of some
fact. Rather, she gains some knowledge-how, which is simply a skill or ability, so that premise
26I follow Byrne (2006).
270r better: all the fundamental physical facts related to color vision. I suppress this qualification for sim-
plicity of exposition.
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(3) is false. Mary gains the ability to visually imagine an experience of red, recognize redness,
or something similar (I here ignore the question of what, exactly, the ability in question is
supposed to be, since this is orthogonal to our main concerns). The fact that someone with
complete knowledge of the fundamental physical facts might still lack certain abilities is, of
course, no objection to physicalism, so Jackson's argument fails to accomplish its aim.
It is natural to take Intellectualism to block this response to Jackson's argument, since if
know-how is knowledge of a fact, then if Mary acquires know-how, Mary acquires knowledge
of a fact, allowing the reductio of physicalism to go through. Stanley and Williamson, for
instance, press this line of argument. I want to set aside my own view about know-how for
a moment and consider two responses to the worry that are helpfully discussed by Yuri Cath
(2009a).
The first strategy is to pursue what Cath calls the "fallback response" of abandoning the
claim that Mary acquires some know-how and simply retaining the claim that Mary acquires
new abilities. The idea is that know-how per se is inessential to the ability hypothesis - it
is, after all, the ability hypothesis. S&W provide two problems for this response and Cath
adds his own, but I think none of the problems are convincing. Cath's worry is that if the
physicalist denies that Mary gains know-how, then the ability response "no longer speaks to
our intuition that Mary learns something upon release and thereby gains knowledge. Being
able to say that Mary learns how to do something, and thereby gains knowledge-how, seems
to me to be a clearly essential feature of the ability hypothesis" (2009a: 141). This worry
relies on the premise that for Mary to gain abilities is not sufficient for our being able to
say that Mary learns something, and this is a quite dubious premise. Even if ability is not
understood in terms of know-how, we commonly conceive of increasing one's abilities (at
sports or at solving a certain kind of problem, e.g.) as a kind of learning. And as Wallis would
emphasize, this is not merely a feature of folk psychology: in cognitive science it is common
to discuss such learning under the heading of the acquisition of "procedural knowledge" or
"skill knowledge".
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Perhaps Cath intends to highlight some more basic intuition: Even if gaining the relevant
ability could be considered learning, gaining the ability would not amount to being enlight-
ened about some aspect of seeing red things. Cath would then be arguing that the crucial
premise (4) of the Knowledge Argument really rests on the intuition that Mary is so enlight-
ened. But if this is the intuition that is supposed to block the ability response, it would seem
to apply equally to the unmodified view that says that Mary gains some know-how when she
leaves the room. For coming to know how to imagine red things seems to have the same sta-
tus as gaining the ability to imagine red as far as being enlightened goes - if, independently
of your view about Intellectualism, you doubt that becoming able to imagine red is gaining
some enlightenment about what it is like to see red, then you probably have the same doubt
about coming to know how to imagine red, in which case you have simply rejected the abil-
ity response from the start. Perhaps that is the right move to make, but it is independent of
the question of whether Intellectualism is true, and I will therefore move on to other worries
about the fallback version of the ability response.
I turn now to S&W's worries for the fallback position. The first is directed at someone who
thinks that there is no such thing as knowing how to imagine red - there is only being able to
imagine red. I do not find this view plausible, but it is worth discussing S&W's objection in
any case. The problem is supposed to be that being able to imagine red is the ability to perform
a certain intentional action, and that ability requires knowledge of how to imagine red, which
(on their view) is knowledge that a certain way w is a way for one to imagine red. They state:
"We do find it very plausible that intentional actions are employments of knowledge-how"
(2001: 442), but they do not provide an argument for their claim. If the claim is true perhaps 28
there is a problem for the fallback position, but in the absence of a convincing argument, it is
perfectly reasonable for the physicalist to hold the following position: "Since, as S&W have
28I say "perhaps" because all intentional actions could be employments of knowledge-how without it being
true that any intentional action of Oing were an employment of knowledge how to 0. Just for illustration,
one could hold that (a) 4ing is an employment of knowledge how to perform the various sub-tasks whose
performance would together amount to 4ing, and (b) knowledge how to perform such sub-tasks does not entail
knowledge how to 0. But S&W seem to have had the stronger claim in mind.
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convinced me, knowing how to imagine red is ordinary knowledge of some proposition about
ways to imagine red, being able to intentionally imagine red does not require knowledge of
how to do it. For it is quite implausible that when we intentionally imagine red we need to
apply our knowledge that such-and-such is a way to imagine red."
S&W's second worry applies only to someone who maintains that Mary knows how to
imagine red while she is still in the room but that she acquires the ability to imagine red when
she leaves. Their argument against this position is this: "If she knows how to imagine an ex-
perience of red, why is she unable to imagine such an experience?" (Stanley and Williamson
2001: 443) I must confess to finding the worry utterly baffling given the dialectic in which it
is set. One of S&W's main claims is that knowing how to do something does not entail being
able to do it - we must distinguish know-how and ability. That is precisely the objection
that they pose to Ryle's view of know-how. I certainly agree that, on one interpretation of
'know how', someone can know how to do something without being able to do it, and I see no
justification for S&W's position. Why would mental abilities be different in principle from
other sorts of abilities? Whatever the source of the gap between know-how and ability in one
domain, why would there not be the same gap in the other?
Of course, S&W do not take a stand on what propositions one would know in knowing
how to visually imagine an experience of a red thing, so perhaps they could argue that there is
some special reason in this case that the usual gap between know-how and ability is inapplica-
ble. But they have provided no such argument, nor any reason to think that such an argument
could be given. So summing up so far, I think it is perfectly open for someone like Lewis or
Nemirow to emphasize that the ability hypothesis is the ability hypothesis, and that the notion
of know-how is dispensable for the purposes of responding to the Knowledge Argument. But
there is another excellent defense of the ability hypothesis that is closely related to the one
pursued by Cath. The response relies on my distinction between (WI) and (SI).
If we recall that (WI) allows that know-how might not be a sort of theoretical knowledge
and might therefore lack various properties of knowledge-that as ordinarily conceived, we can
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see that as far as (WI) goes, practical know-how might be incapable of interacting with other
knowledge in processes like conscious reasoning. And in that case, Mary might simply be
incapable of gaining practical know-how by inference from the fundamental physical facts,
even if she could gain by inference some knowledge - theoretical knowledge - of the
proposition that is the content of knowledge how to imagine an experience of a red thing.
This response takes issue with the inference from (5), (1) and (2) to (6). Mary was not in
a position to have the knowledge she later gained, but that was not because she was not in
a position to know the proposition to which the knowledge she gained related her. Rather,
she was not in a position to acquire the kind of knowledge of that proposition that she later
acquired.
To put the point another way, what is important to using know-how to respond to the
knowledge argument is the gap between knowledge of the fundamental physical facts and
possession of practical know-how. The crucial thing to ask, then, is whether this gap would be
closed by (WI). The answer is negative. On its own, know-how's having propositional content
entails nothing about whether it could be acquired by anyone who knew all the fundamental
physical facts - whether it could be so acquired depends on the nature of the know-how
relation itself, not simply on what sort of relata the knowledge has.
It may be unclear whether or why this is a version of the ability response rather than a
version of the old fact / new mode response. But it may be a version of both - the difference
between them is not so great as it seemed. (Here I am indebted to Cath's discussion.) But the
reason I think it fair to view the strategy just sketched as a way of showing that (WI) does not
affect the ability response is that the strategy relies on exactly the point that gives the original
ability response its force. The original ability response only has any plausibility because of a
prior thought that knowing all the fundamental physical facts is not sufficient to provide one
with the relevant know-how. If knowing all the facts about the brain and color vision were
enough to give Mary knowledge of how to imagine red, then objecting to the third premise
would be useless for the physicalist - the following premise could simply be added to the
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argument:
(3*) If Mary knows all the fundamental physical facts about the brain and color vision,
then Mary is in a position to know how to 0.29
This premise is implausible (which of course is exactly why the ability response has been
assumed to get off the ground), but if one accepted it, it would not matter if one rejected
(3), the premise that the ability response is usually taken to reject. For premise (3) could be
replaced with a weaker premise to derive the anti-physicalist conclusion.
(4*) If Mary acquires knowledge when she leaves her room, she acquires knowledge of a
fact or knowledge of how to 4.
The revised argument would be as follows.
1"*. When she is still in the room, Mary knows all the fundamental physical facts.
2*. If Mary knows all the fundamental physical facts, then Mary is in a position to know
all the facts entailed by the fundamental physical facts.
3*. If Mary knows all the fundamental physical facts, then Mary is in a position to know
how to 4.
4*. If Mary acquires knowledge when she leaves her room, she acquires knowledge of a
fact or knowledge of how to 0.
5*. When Mary leaves the room, she acquires knowledge that she had not been in a position
to acquire while in the room.
6*. So when Mary leaves the room, she does not acquire knowledge of how to 4. [From
(3*) and (5*)]
29Say, to know how to visually imagine an experience of seeing red. Substitute your favored bit of know-how
if you think the ability response should rely on, say, knowledge of how to recognize red things.
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7*. So when Mary leaves the room, she acquires knowledge of a fact that she had not been
in a position to acquire while in the room. [From (4*), (5*) and (6*)]
8*. So Mary acquires knowledge of a fact that is not entailed by the fundamental physical
facts. [From (7*), (1*) and (2*)]
9*. So there is a fact that is not entailed by the fundamental physical facts. [From (7*)].
Putting the argument this way shows that in the original version of the ability response,
it is useful to reject the claim that Mary learns a fact when she leaves the room only if one
tacitly relies on the rejection of (3*). And the rejection of (3*) is exactly what is preserved by
the revised version of the ability response that I sketched just above: Mary is not in a position
to know how to 0 because know-how is not the kind of knowledge that one is always in a
position to acquire merely by knowing propositions that entail the relevant proposition about
how to 4.
I mentioned above that this response was closely related to Cath's own revised version
of the ability response, and that it could be considered a version of the old-fact/new-mode
response. This connects to S&W's idea that know-how is knowledge of a proposition under
a practical mode of presentation. Cath's response takes issue with the Knowledge Argument
at the same point as the response I have suggested, and indeed Cath appeals to S&W's PMPs
to illustrate one way to defend the claim that know-how cannot play the role in reasoning
necessary for Mary to be in a position to gain it on the basis of knowing all the fundamental
physical facts: Mary cannot come to know how to imagine an experience of red because
knowing the fundamental physical facts about color vision does not suffice to allow one to
acquire knowledge about color vision under a practical mode of presentation. While I find
talk of practical modes of presentation unenlightening and unmotivated, Cath's response to
the knowledge argument seems to me well-motivated from within the perspective of S&W's
theory of know-how.
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The final point I want to make about know-how and the knowledge argument is also
the most straightforward, at least from the perspective of my own view about know-how.
Everyone agrees that Mary learns some propositions when she leaves the black and white
room. She learns that she has seen red, that she can imagine red, that she is able to recognize
red, and so on. These propositions were all false before she left the room, so it is no threat to
physicalism that she did not know them. My position is simply that for S to know how to (in
the relevant sense of 'know how') is just for S to have non-theoretical, practical knowledge
that S can 4 in way w. If S cannot 4, then the proposition is false, and hence S does not know
how to 1. So even though Mary learns a fact when she leaves the room, this is no threat to
physicalism because the relevant fact did not obtain until she left the room - Mary could not
imagine an experience of red while she is still in the room.
I have been focussing exclusively on one application of anti-Intellectualism, but the dis-
tinction between (WI) and (SI) is also relevant to another application worth mentioning. As
S&W note, various authors have claimed that knowing a language is having know-how, not
knowledge-that. Once we recognize that this claim could be intended as the claim that know-
ing a language is not having theoretical knowledge, we see that it may be distinct from the
question of whether knowing a language is having knowledge with propositional content.
(WL) Knowledge of a language is knowledge that has a proposition as a relatum.
(SL) Knowledge of a language is theoretical knowledge.
Both theses are worth discussing, but (SL) seems to me a much more substantive and inter-
esting claim, and I suspect that it is the claim that most authors have had in mind in debating
the nature of linguistic knowledge. Dean Pettit (2002), for instance, argues that understand-
ing a language cannot be understood as the possession of propositional knowledge, but it is
clear that his conclusion is really that understanding a language cannot be understood as the
possession of propositional knowledge of the usual sort - understanding a language does
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not require justification or belief, for instance.30
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